History of Sexuality
Among Michel Foucault’s last works, volume I of The History of Sexuality narrates a history in which the discourse of sexuality normalized, categorized, classified, and vocalized it. He dispels the common myth that sexual repression has characterized Western society since at least the 17th century, countering that instead discourses of sexuality proliferated and were deployed as political and social controls that have permeated the body politic. Sexuality has been socially constructed as a discourse of power epitomized by the “confession” of one’s sexuality, be it to a priest, a psychoanalyst, or the public, as exemplified in the “coming out” of homosexuals (although this last instance was not addressed in this work). In the traditional French historical- narrative style, Foucault examines how this discourse constructed boundaries of what was considered “normal” or acceptable. The most interesting and salient insights from this work, for me, and those which I anticipate leading discussion on tomorrow, include:
1) the claim of science, scholars, theoreticians, and of course the psychoanalysts, to hold a monopoly on the designation of deviance.
2) the “deployment of ‘sexuality’” began in the privileged classes then spread to the rest of society (122) as a means of social control and political subjugation (123). But is birth control, for example, a means of control or a method of regaining control? Or perhaps for Foucault it is both? I have to admit I’m not 100% sure about how his theory of power applies here.
3) I found myself wondering about his choice of historical junctures, and I didn’t necessarily feel he made an entirely compelling case. Hasn’t sexuality been regulated and normalized since the advent of circumcision? And one must wonder at his broad culturalist brush strokes that paints
In a discussion last week in a class on
4) This article, by an unknown author, identifies some of the key themes in this work and demonstrates how Foucault was instrumental in the development of queer theory, although one is left wondering about the power implications for the codification of queer theory as a field of study given what we have read about “the academy”. If we take Foucault’s emphasis on the power that discourse on sexuality gave the state, the doctor, the clinic, the prison, then does talking about queer theory in an academic setting, in which it is implicitly held up as contrary to the norm or worthy of being acceptable as a norm, have implications for discursive power relations? I claim no familiarity with this field but found quite compelling his argument about normalization being a socially constructed value that shifts over time, and would be interested in hearing comments about the applications of Foucauldian thought in this field.
posted by C at 9:36 PM
2 Comments:
This week’s reading was particularly interesting to me as a Swede, since we – through our genetic code – are obsessed with everything and anything that has to do with sex. But apparently we’re not alone, and apparently we should stop bragging about our liberal attitude toward sex, because it would seem we’re not breaking the taboos we thought:
“The society that emerged in the nineteenth century – bourgeois, capitalist, or industrial society, call it what you will – did not confront sex with a fundamental refusal of recognition. On the contrary, it put into operation an entire machinery for producing true discourses concerning it” (69). Aha.
Having taken part in the same discussion regarding circumcision as CCR last week, I would like to point out that the historical roots of circumcision are unclear, and there is no unanimity among scholars on whether or not it has been primarily utilized as a way of controlling the sexuality of children (or young adults, since some cultures don’t circumcise their infants, but rather their adolescents). In fact, there is substantial evidence that it has had different functions at different times and in different cultures.
What is interesting is the way certain practices gain the status of ‘normality’; the culture of mass-circumcision in North America today seems likely to be grounded in a fear of having your child ‘deviate’ from the norm. Indeed, in ancient Greece it was the other way around; in the schools, or Gymnasiums, where the dress code was ‘birthday suit’ (gymnos being the Greek work for ‘naked’ and ‘gymnasium’ is, incidentally, also what Swedish high schools are called…) those who were circumcised were considered deviant. Apparently, the Greek – having an eye for male beauty – considered the male penis a perfect creation that was mutilated through circumcision.
As usual, I digress. Back to Foucault. What would he say about female genital mutilation? Well, the term itself speaks volumes in favor of his argument: could there be a clearer example of a term reflecting a discourse within which to appropriate the meaning of a phenomenon? Female genital mutilation. Compare that to the more ‘medical’ and benign ‘male circumcision.’ Granted, there are medical differences between the two procedures, but there are various forms of female genital mutilation, some more intrusive than others. And, not to get to technical, but depending on the level of development of the penis at the time of the supposedly benign male circumcision, the degree of damage done varies. In other words, it’s all a pretty nasty business, but the ‘truth’ is determined by the dominant discourse, nes pas?
As usual, fantastic commentaries. I'm really looking forward to class today.
I'm thinking about Julie's comment (4) especially because Deborah Bergoffen talked last night (I think) on how rape became a crime against humanity. But I'm going to post about my own reaction, which, I think, touches on CCR’s point (4) about the interactions between discussions of normalization within the academy and enactments of normalization within the public-praxis. [As I’m about to post this, I see that KSG has raised the same point in her (4)]
There's one thing I'm still wondering about, and that is the mechanics of Foucault's argument, specifically, the relationship between what is said and how it is said. If, as CCR so aptly puts it, "discourses of sexuality proliferated and were deployed as political and social controls that have permeated the body politic," then how does Foucault's own work on the subject fit into this dual movement of repression/proliferation? Two possible responses: (1) it's a function of the same movement, perhaps altering the course but nevertheless perpetuating the movement; (2) it's a disclosure of the movement, which means it is not a part of the same movement, does not perpetuate but transforms it, by first opening up the movement for full view, allowing us –readers- to see this movement, in this way, and therefore, for the first time, albeit this is done, necessarily, from within the movement.
Foucauldian sympathizers probably won't like response (1). But for response (2), other Habermasians in the class can correct me on this, and I'm not necessarily endorsing this criticism, but am merely interested discussing its status: what of the performative contradiction in the idea that Foucault tells us sexuality is X but in doing so, shows just that sexuality is NOT X? (i.e., to say “we never talk about sex” is to talk about sex).
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