Three Tractarian Quandries
Since everyone (wisely? foolishly?) chose to avoid presenting this week on Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, it falls to me -- yet again -- to post the weekly blog entry that everyone can respond to. Let me simply post three questions dealing with specific passages of this complex and seminal work, in the hopes that they will stimulate some interesting reflections.
1) in 6.44, Wittgenstein writes: "Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is." Statements about the world as a whole do not seem to fall into the universe of propositions, since propositions have to be about objects in the world, and the world is not an object in the world. Hence statements about the world existing would fall outside of the boundaries of logic, and thus outside of the boundaries of the sayable. But if this is the case, why isn't it equally mystical to make claims about the existence or nonexistence of things in the world? Why is any statement not mystical?
2) in 3.1432, Wittgenstein writes: "We must not say, 'The complex sign "aRb" says "a stands in relation R to b"'; but we must say, 'That "a" stands in a certain relation to "b" says that aRb'." If the arrangement of objects already says this, what use is the propositional expression of that relationship? is there in fact any meaningful difference between the proposition "aRb" and the state of affairs such that a stands in relationship R to b?
3) in 6.3631, Wittgenstein writes: "It is clear that there are no grounds for believing that the simplest course of events will really happen." This is part of his criticisms of induction, causal reasoning, and the like. Given his position, does this work have anything to offer to social scientists -- for whom induction and causation are among the more commonly-deployed tools of the trade?
[Posted with ecto]
1) in 6.44, Wittgenstein writes: "Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is." Statements about the world as a whole do not seem to fall into the universe of propositions, since propositions have to be about objects in the world, and the world is not an object in the world. Hence statements about the world existing would fall outside of the boundaries of logic, and thus outside of the boundaries of the sayable. But if this is the case, why isn't it equally mystical to make claims about the existence or nonexistence of things in the world? Why is any statement not mystical?
2) in 3.1432, Wittgenstein writes: "We must not say, 'The complex sign "aRb" says "a stands in relation R to b"'; but we must say, 'That "a" stands in a certain relation to "b" says that aRb'." If the arrangement of objects already says this, what use is the propositional expression of that relationship? is there in fact any meaningful difference between the proposition "aRb" and the state of affairs such that a stands in relationship R to b?
3) in 6.3631, Wittgenstein writes: "It is clear that there are no grounds for believing that the simplest course of events will really happen." This is part of his criticisms of induction, causal reasoning, and the like. Given his position, does this work have anything to offer to social scientists -- for whom induction and causation are among the more commonly-deployed tools of the trade?
[Posted with ecto]
posted by ProfPTJ at 9:26 PM
3 Comments:
FROM BEN--
For some odd reason, I am unable to post - when I try the page goes dead - it may be wireless related. So,here is my post:
I have three responses based upon my rudimentary
reading of Wittgenstein & an additional three
questions of my own:
1) Any statement isn’t mystical to the extent to which
it deals with atomistic facts. It is only when these
facts, made propositions seek to depict the enitre
world, all facts and hence all propositions, as
ontology that they enter the realm of the mystical.
In this respect a statement about facts in the world
does potentially care an ontological essence or
mystical component in that this is a priori.
Wittgenstein’s writing especially after 6.4 enters the
realm of mysticism and this may be why he so
disapproved for Russell’s introduction to his book.
This is precisely when it moves from Ned’s accurate
depiction of a simplistic computer program (the realm
of logic) to the realm of the ‘feeling the world as a
whole’ (6.45), the mystical, that which manifests in
the world and cannot be put into words (6.522).
2) Yes, there is a meaningful difference. ‘Situations
can be described, but not given names’ (3.144). The
first for Wittgenstein aRb is a ‘point’, ‘"a" stands
in a certain relation to "b" says that aRb' an
‘arrow’; the first a name, the second a true
proposition. Propositions describe objects in a
certain way that the ‘arrow’ corresponds to the object
of the thought. Names are meant to convey atomistic
facts.
3) Neerada makes a good case in her post for dual
existence of uncertainty and probability. Because of
uncertainty we are left with Popperesque falsification
as a means of denying possible outcomes as a means of
determining more probabilistic ones. But where I
begin to see the boundaries blur is in the extent of
human rationality. If we take Kierkegaard, humans
are tragic, even comic, but never rational. Even
probabilistic employments of induction and causation
are subject to the rationality of actors or our
ability to hypothesis how a rational outcome is
altered by either pre-existing gains, identity, or
informational constraints. Social science is more
social alchemy if it rigidly fixates itself (due to
calls for logical consistency and parsimony) upon a
hypothesized state of pure rationality. We have to
measure and investigate social outcomes and hence are
locked to a constantly changing subject. This should
not diminish though our desire to both tell stories
and build causal models predication upon causation.
If physics can show circumstances under which mass can
bend light, can we not seek to show even amidst
uncertainty situations in which both subjective and
objective factors of existence ‘bend’ the rational
mind and alter probabilistic outcomes?
Turning back to Wittgenstein, in the social sciences
we can look at logical necessity and impossibility in
human endeavors, seeking to understanding the logical
form of our social world; i.e. examine forms vs. laws.
Now for some fun, here are my Wittgenstein trivia
questions, for each respond true or false:
Wittgenstein loved Westerns….
Wittgenstein was the son of an Austrian steel
magnate….
The third question is intended as a topic of class
discussion. Is ‘Tractatus’ about ethics or logic?
Does it reflect a Kantian ‘mapping from within’ of the
confines of the world and the role of ethics or is
simply an exposition of the logical form of the world?
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I am SO not confident that I've grokked this week's readings, but my response to 6.3631 is 6.5 - 6.51: If a question can be phrased, it can be answered. If Wittgenstein's aim is to convince readers to discard their inferential ladders behind them, then this is not incompatible with the metaphorical practices of building custom-sized ladders, selecting one with the right dimensions, and leaning it up against the intellectual edifice one intends to scale. So his contribution to the social sciences would appear to be the underlining of uncertainty and a kind of Hacking-esque unmasking project.
Side note: I don't like the concept of an inexpressible dimension of mystic-ness lying beyond the frontier of all answered questions in 6.52. For one, this frontier is a stupid thing to postulate, because one can always stand at this frontier and ask 'Have all questions been answered?', thereby moving it one answer away from you. Duh. And even if it were a rigid boundary, why call some spurious Buffyverse into existence beyond it?
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