Conversational Realities
Does reducing everything to conversation make any more sense than reducing everything to material objects?
This question bothered me throughout my reading of Conversational Realities, but especially in Shotter's discussion of the mind. I concede that human beings from different social and historical backgrounds have different ways of understanding the mind, and that all may be mythical. However, I don't accept Shotter's argument that mental process is linguistic. In the very beginning (pg. 2), Shotter writes, "In other words, instead of understanding our thoughts and ideas being presented to us as if visually, like we see bounded, material objects, in an instant, we are coming to talk of them as having more the quality of an extended sequence of commands or instructions as to how to act.... [I]t is as if such commands or instructions are presented to us dialogically or conversationally by the voice of an other, one who responds to each phase of our action by indicating to us a next feature to which we should attend... [I]nstead of in visual and ocular metaphors, we are coming to make sense of our talk in terms of metaphors drawn from the realm of talk itself." Reflecting on my own thoughts and ideas, I would agree that many have a dialogical quality to them, particularly with regard to certain types of processes--decision-making, in particular. Other thoughts and ideas are presented to me visually, or through other senses. A startle response to a large sound is, to me, auditory but not linguistic. Of course, I could transform an auditory or visual or olfactory thought into a mental conversation, if so inclined--but does that make all of my thoughts dialogic or conversational?
Shotter's assertion that there are no "extralinguistic entities whose significance is linguistically clear prior to talk 'about' them; there are no extralinguistic 'somethings' in the world merely awaiting precise or accurate description" (pg. 182) strikes me as both obvious and clearly outrageous, making me wonder if his scare-quoted prepositions are working overtime--prepositions have always been slippery for me anyway, so perhaps I'm just misunderstanding. On the one hand, he seems to have constructed a tautology: What does the linguistic clarity of X mean if X hasn't been talked about? How can an "extralinguistic entity" X be "linguistically clear" regardless of the talk of/about X? And then, in the second half of the sentence, Shotter seems to be arguing that there is nothing extralinguistic in the world at all. To me, there is quite a lot in the world that is extralinguistic.
Aspects of the book reminded me of our discussion on Monday about the difference between relativism and pluralism with regard to theories and disciplinary debates. I appreciated his call for a "tradition of argumentation" as a "continuous, noneliminative, inclusionary, multi-voiced conversation" (pg. 9). Such a tradition would seem to address our hopes for pluralism, without succumbing to relativism. How can we produce or construct this pluralistic civil society?
I'll end there for now, to get things started. Please accept my apologies for the late posting--I'm still recovering from the wild ride of a week we've all had plus the remains of this evil infection.
This question bothered me throughout my reading of Conversational Realities, but especially in Shotter's discussion of the mind. I concede that human beings from different social and historical backgrounds have different ways of understanding the mind, and that all may be mythical. However, I don't accept Shotter's argument that mental process is linguistic. In the very beginning (pg. 2), Shotter writes, "In other words, instead of understanding our thoughts and ideas being presented to us as if visually, like we see bounded, material objects, in an instant, we are coming to talk of them as having more the quality of an extended sequence of commands or instructions as to how to act.... [I]t is as if such commands or instructions are presented to us dialogically or conversationally by the voice of an other, one who responds to each phase of our action by indicating to us a next feature to which we should attend... [I]nstead of in visual and ocular metaphors, we are coming to make sense of our talk in terms of metaphors drawn from the realm of talk itself." Reflecting on my own thoughts and ideas, I would agree that many have a dialogical quality to them, particularly with regard to certain types of processes--decision-making, in particular. Other thoughts and ideas are presented to me visually, or through other senses. A startle response to a large sound is, to me, auditory but not linguistic. Of course, I could transform an auditory or visual or olfactory thought into a mental conversation, if so inclined--but does that make all of my thoughts dialogic or conversational?
Shotter's assertion that there are no "extralinguistic entities whose significance is linguistically clear prior to talk 'about' them; there are no extralinguistic 'somethings' in the world merely awaiting precise or accurate description" (pg. 182) strikes me as both obvious and clearly outrageous, making me wonder if his scare-quoted prepositions are working overtime--prepositions have always been slippery for me anyway, so perhaps I'm just misunderstanding. On the one hand, he seems to have constructed a tautology: What does the linguistic clarity of X mean if X hasn't been talked about? How can an "extralinguistic entity" X be "linguistically clear" regardless of the talk of/about X? And then, in the second half of the sentence, Shotter seems to be arguing that there is nothing extralinguistic in the world at all. To me, there is quite a lot in the world that is extralinguistic.
Aspects of the book reminded me of our discussion on Monday about the difference between relativism and pluralism with regard to theories and disciplinary debates. I appreciated his call for a "tradition of argumentation" as a "continuous, noneliminative, inclusionary, multi-voiced conversation" (pg. 9). Such a tradition would seem to address our hopes for pluralism, without succumbing to relativism. How can we produce or construct this pluralistic civil society?
I'll end there for now, to get things started. Please accept my apologies for the late posting--I'm still recovering from the wild ride of a week we've all had plus the remains of this evil infection.
posted by Anonymous at 3:28 AM
1 Comments:
Compadres and comadres,
I have only a few surly swipes to be made at the author of the day, because I actually found Shotter's argument a pleasure to read, even if it is a pile of SC cloudcuckoo-ology. I have noticed similarly raised spirits in other members of the cohort this week, I must say; maybe we're all just going through the academic equivalent of our second wind.
So, Shotter.
1) When he is talking about the need to display an 'awareness of the possibility of ... challenges' to our need to be 'perceived as speaking authoritatively about factual matters' [6], are the facts he invokes meant to be brute, i.e. concrete, or rhetorical-representative ones? If the former, then has is he displaying some kind of sneaky Bhaskarian affiliation, and if the latter, how can one have 'authority' over the subjective? Doesn't this bring us back to the 'how do we know what we know' debate from seminar one? I was particularly concerned by the effects of this unresolved issue in the chapter on civil society. If all that is at stake in the rhetorical contestations which he discusses (invoking a bunch of hoary old structuralists to do so, by the way) is the flexibility and potential for expression exhibited by the rhetorical-relational connections in society, where does this leave social activism? Should activists concentrate on freeing slaves, or teaching them to wear their chains more creatively ands expressively? Does Shotter's account allow the notion of 'objective' or 'concrete' oppression? Is a happy slave still a slave? Are battered spouses still being abused? Can of worms...
2) My ongoing position: I'd like to hear how everyone intends to use this in their IR research, because without anthropomorphising left and right, how precisely are we to apply this 'individual humans in a social web' argument to 'individual states in a global society of states' (koffkoffGADDISkoff)? I guess the bit that looked most useful to me was the idea that self-construction requires an empowering audience. On the state level, I'd like to flip that on its head and say that the hungry vaccuum of international approval prompts states into certain channels of self-expression, and I'd use post-94 Rwanda and South Africa as (what I feel to be) two excellent examples.
Ding.
Post a Comment
<< Home