Vocations and methodology
As I suggested at the end of class today, I do think that there's a connection between Weber's scientific vocation and the issues of methodology we'll be considering for the rest of the semester. Simply put, the only people who care all that much about methodological issues (with "methodology" here defined as the logic of inquiry, the rationale for using particular data-collection and data-analysis techniques, and the philosophical assumptions contained therein) are those with science as a vocation, since to others (perhaps especially those with politics as a vocation) issues of research design and epistemic status are somewhat beside the point. but for those with science as a vocation, these issues are necessarily central to any piece of research and any knowledge-claim, as they speak directly to the question of what it means to know anything about the world.
Of course, if Weber is incorrect in his sharp delineation between science and politics, then maybe there are modes of politics for which methodological issues are significant. I would side with Weber and argue that the animating value of political action is efficacy, and that therefore concern with methodology would have to be secondary in any politician's mind; whether a claim is valid is considerably less important, politically speaking, than whether it works. And "works" in this context means "produces the desired effect." Sometimes -- often? -- that might require ignoring questions of consistency and coherence.
But that leaves a question: what use, if any, is social science to politics if politicians routinely, and by vocation, are unconcerned with what social scientists are concerned with? is the logical implication of Weber's distinction that social scientists should have nothing to do with politics and with politicians? And similarly, should politicians just ignore social science?
Of course, if Weber is incorrect in his sharp delineation between science and politics, then maybe there are modes of politics for which methodological issues are significant. I would side with Weber and argue that the animating value of political action is efficacy, and that therefore concern with methodology would have to be secondary in any politician's mind; whether a claim is valid is considerably less important, politically speaking, than whether it works. And "works" in this context means "produces the desired effect." Sometimes -- often? -- that might require ignoring questions of consistency and coherence.
But that leaves a question: what use, if any, is social science to politics if politicians routinely, and by vocation, are unconcerned with what social scientists are concerned with? is the logical implication of Weber's distinction that social scientists should have nothing to do with politics and with politicians? And similarly, should politicians just ignore social science?
posted by ProfPTJ at 9:45 PM
9 Comments:
testing
I accept Weber's distinction between the vocation of science vs. politics, where "vocation" means "calling." I am less inclined to accept the distinction in reference to specific professions or job titles. That is to say, I agree that there are those that have a calling for science or a calling for politics, but I do not agree that these types self-segregate into two groups, professors and politicians.
If we consider methodology as a concern for how to cash out claims, we find that many people in many types of professions exhibit this concern, while some others do not.
When we ask ourselves, "How will this claim hold up to scrutiny?" we also ask, "Scrutiny by whom and with what consequences?" Perhaps Weber would say that the masses do not closely scrutinize the claims of politicians, allowing them to get away with murder (literally).
I counter this with statements both cynical and optimistic. First, the cynical: Couldn't we say that academics also escape scrutiny and get away with a lot? (Why are there so many bad translations of Weber?) Next, the optimistic: Can't we also say that policy analysts face intense scrutiny - from other politicians, academics, journalists, lobbyists, etc. and that many rise to the challenge and embrace methodological rigor? Audiences may care about methodological issues to various degrees, but we cannot say in advance the degree to which specific audiences will care (the academic community vs. the political community).
One thing motivating the degree of concern is the anticipated consequence of failing to pass muster. I can imagine a professor saying, "If this article doesn't measure up, it won't get published and I won't get tenure this year." I can also imagine a politician saying, "If this bill doesn't measure up, then I don't have a viable plan for reducing unemployment in the coming year and millions of people will continue to suffer." Both face consequences for failing to pass muster, and their motivations cannot be reduced to a desire for knowledge versus a desire for power.
Certainly, this isn't about their motivations. (Almost nothing in Weber is, but that's a longer conversation.) The standards to which different pieces of work are held, however, are quite different, and I read this as part of Weber's point: the different vocations are required precisely because the domains have such different standards associated with them. Not all "scrutiny" is the same. And I would further suggest that the politician concerned with getting a bill adopted has zippo concern with methodology, since she or he is focused on consequences and results -- which it, as I take it, Weber's point. The point of Weber's distinction, in many ways, is the incompatibility of the two domains at a logical level.
So, the claim is that professors are systematically held to higher standards and subjected to greater scrutiny than politicians. I wonder what evidence would falsify this claim?
Would any other classmates care to chime in?
The logic of the domains of science and politics do seem rather incompatible.
The scientist and the politician assume public positions and seem thereby forced to act according to the perhaps ideal-typical notions constituting the concept of 'scientist' and 'politician', in their minds and the minds of those who scrutinize them.
Scientists and politicians, like anyone else, do what their peers set them get away with. They police themselves, as individuals, to the degree that they indeed have a vocation for their endeavors.
There probably is some self-segregation, and the rest would seem to be accomplished in line with the dynamics addressed in the second paragraph above.
'Paragraph two above' should've included 'practices' in addition to notions/ideas.
That would seem important...
I understand Weber to include civil servants among those with a vocation for politics. ProfPTJ, could you confirm this?
For if civil servants are included, I have an example I'd like to share from a civil servant regarding the peer review process to which her written work is subjected before it is made public.
To my understanding science informs politics, and it seems these days, politics also informs the kind of scientific inquiry pursued. I would gather that Weber would prefer that they be separate entities but i don't see how that could be a feasible approach. Scientists produce knowledge and politicians use said available "knowledge" to influence action
Gee. I'm increasingly uncomfortable with this notion of segregating politics from science.
A critical/reflexive (self-aware/self-interrogating) social science is political indeed.
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