Local knowledge wandering on universal terrain?
In light of our focus on ethnography as such localized and specific methodology that defies generalization and broad-scope theorizing, it's quite striking that Abbott argues that even localized knowledge can be mapped onto a "terrain" of "universal knowledge" (p. 4), offering both a taxonomy and a lifecycle for the fractal divisions that fill out that terrain, and outlining the ways that competing ideas advance in this intellectual space. He asserts:
"...The vast majority of social scientist share the moral project of knowing society in a way that everyone else in society thinks of as universalist. We can try to add 'the voice of the unheard' to our work, but the unheard know very well that social science is something other than their world, that it is addressed to someone other than them. The project of social science as a definable enterprise is, in reality, the production of sharable, 'universal' knowledge of society. We ought to stop kidding ourselves that it is not." (p.5)
There seems something rather of brutal, but perhaps realistic, about his depiction of the way social sciences (and social scientists) advance. I think a number of the authors of "Political Ethnography" would push back: the work of particularly the ethnographer is in fact for the unheard, and not just the academic colleagues who will review the journal article or book, and what is valuable about the research is not the theoretical infrastructure within which findings are framed, but rather the very localized findings themselves. In Zirakzadeh's chapter on the Basque resistance movement, one gets the sense that unversalized theories are a window dressing to gain acceptance within certain academic circles, but that the heart of his work--what he really cares about--is telling the specific story of the Basque nationalists with whom he interacted.
Are we just kidding ourselves, as Abbott suggests, or does his analysis of knowledge creation as fractal processes on a universal terrain miss something rather important about what social scientists aim to contribute through their (our) work?
"...The vast majority of social scientist share the moral project of knowing society in a way that everyone else in society thinks of as universalist. We can try to add 'the voice of the unheard' to our work, but the unheard know very well that social science is something other than their world, that it is addressed to someone other than them. The project of social science as a definable enterprise is, in reality, the production of sharable, 'universal' knowledge of society. We ought to stop kidding ourselves that it is not." (p.5)
There seems something rather of brutal, but perhaps realistic, about his depiction of the way social sciences (and social scientists) advance. I think a number of the authors of "Political Ethnography" would push back: the work of particularly the ethnographer is in fact for the unheard, and not just the academic colleagues who will review the journal article or book, and what is valuable about the research is not the theoretical infrastructure within which findings are framed, but rather the very localized findings themselves. In Zirakzadeh's chapter on the Basque resistance movement, one gets the sense that unversalized theories are a window dressing to gain acceptance within certain academic circles, but that the heart of his work--what he really cares about--is telling the specific story of the Basque nationalists with whom he interacted.
Are we just kidding ourselves, as Abbott suggests, or does his analysis of knowledge creation as fractal processes on a universal terrain miss something rather important about what social scientists aim to contribute through their (our) work?
posted by Annie at 5:21 PM
2 Comments:
When I first read that quote from page 5 ("The project of social science as a definable enterprise is, in reality, the production of sharable, 'universal' knowledge of society."), my first response was "WHY?"
Abbott adds, "a universal knowledge ... aims ... at allowing interchange among people who differ fundamentally" (5).
It strikes me that his fractal distinctions theory can only really be useful in a sort of linear way -- the example of mapping a city from a central park typifies this.
If every topic can be indefinitely broken down into fractals, each reflecting the original dialectic, then the knowledge produced from whatever results one garners is inextricably tied to the original choice of location (ie, subject matter, or top point in a fractal diagram), and the decision to divide it into two subfields. This seems like path dependence to me (in a loose interpretation of the term). All derived knowledge from future nodes in the fractal diagram are based on and limited to the original decision and choice of topic. To then call this universal seems a bit suspect to me, but perhaps I don't fully understand his point.
I agree with Annie and think this is a brilliant insight. One of the contributions of ethnographic research is that is may introduce new categories of thinking which are not yet part of the academic fractal structure.
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