Methodological Diversity

 Last week's post began with I am depressed; this week's ought to begin with I am unsure.

In Conduct of Inquiry in IR, Jackson argues that neopositivism, critical realism, analyticism, and reflexivism each contain fundamental assumptions about (1) the “hook-up” between the world and the researcher’s mind, and (2) commitments regarding empiricism and observation. These four ideal-typical philosophical ontological “stances” are “themselves incapable of being definitely justified” (Jackson, 2010: 196). These underlying philosophical ontological components of each of Jackson’s four wagers do not, however, seem equal. As a component of critical realism transfactualism relates to “undetectable properties of both observable and unobservable objects” (Jackson, 2010: 89). Within reflexivism, however, transfactualism relates “not [to] knowledge of specific outcomes”… but to “disclose historical forces and factors shaping the present” (Jackson, 2010: 160). Do the meanings of philosophical ontological components related to empiricism therefore depend on previously made assumptions regarding mind-world “hook-up”?

The remainder of this discussion is promised on the following: I do not dispute the need for pluralism, but I do not necessarily see how such pluralism should take form in practice. If what Jackson recommends is that we apply ontological assumptions based on the research questions we ask and the sort of knowledge we try to produce, is it possible to overcome personal biases among researchers regarding which knowledge-production efforts are most useful? If for instance, we concede that neopositivism makes certain assumptions regarding the mind, the world, and empiricism that align with a particular research question, is it possible to put on the neopositivist hat for that project and then take it off again when another question approaches that may not be so well aligned with neopositivist assumptions? Basically, can Jackson’s pluralism occur within one individual researcher? Or must a researcher be rigid in her/his commitment to particular philosophical ontological assumptions when asking certain questions, albeit open-minded enough to other researchers having different assumptions?

As Banks and O’Mahoney (2010) remark: “the practice of IR rarely fits neatly into one of his four philosophical-ontological boxes” (12), Jackson’s book is at once an ideal-typifying exercise (cf. Jackson, 2010: 37) and a denaturalizing exercise (cf. Jackson, 2010: 43-44). Are there research endeavors that are so complex that they straddle multiple philosophical ontological realms? It might be an interesting challenge to conceptualize other examples of possible unclear combinations across ideal-typified philosophical ontologies.  

On a slightly different, but related, note, consider Grynaviski’s discussion of Jackson’s position regarding Waltz’s ideal-typing: “There is no meaningful sense in which a falsifiable hypothesis generalizing across multiple cases might be developed because these coincidental causes vary by case. Therefore, the only plausible test of Waltz’s theory, using his “own clearly-declared allegiance to such a methodology,” (2010: 151) is to focus on specific cases to see if the pressures at work in Waltz’s theory help structure explanations” (Grynaviski, 2010: 7). If we accept Jackson’s account of Waltz’s work, must we also accept that it is inappropriate to convert Waltz’s declared methodological allegiance into another methodological paradigm for our own use? What I am trying to get at with this question relates to the manner in which knowledge is intertextually produced. New authors produce new knowledge partially by reproducing claims from earlier works through the lens of their own perspective and through the synthesis of multiple texts. If that’s the case, what’s so wrong about taking Waltz’s theory, accepting that it is rooted in analyticist assumptions, and interpreting it using different methodological assumptions to see whether different types of knowledge-claims can also be derived from it? Is there something about philosophical ontological assumptions that precludes such intertextual reinterpretation of theories grounded in specific methodological foundations? (Or is this just something neopositivists do--somehow intrinsic to their philosophical ontological stance (cf. Jackson, 2010 symposium: 22)?)

After all, I do not see Jackson arguing that we should not break down neopositivists’ testable conjectures and create ideal-types from them; nor that we ought to not use the theories posited by both categories of dualists and reflexively reformulate them in order to achieve an emancipatory agenda through denaturalization. In fact, to me it seems that reflexivism all but necessitates that we reposition claims that are bound to other philosophical ontologies! (Is the only difference that neopositivists are the ones going around criticizing work rooted in other methodologies as not living up to neopositivists' own assumptions?) So let me rephrase my previous question: Is there something about philosophical ontological assumptions that precludes such intertextual reinterpretation of theories grounded in specific methodological foundations, or is this critique of neopositivists reframing Waltz just a shot at neopositivists’ dominance in the field?