Social Theory of International Politics
Alexander Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics is such an impressive and extensive undertaking that it's difficult to isolate points for discussion. As with last week's reading on scientific realism, I appreciated Wendt's acknowledgement of a material base for what is primarily a social (and socially constructed) reality. Rather than attempting to pose questions that address the major arguments of his theory, I will use this posting to isolate some of the areas I see as needing further development and/or discussion.
One of the most problematic aspects of Wendt's argument, for me, was his conception of the state as a unitary actor. While his conception of the state (p. 201) claims to combine elements of the organizational (Weberian), reductive (pluralist), and structural (Marxist) theories of the state, the pluralist conception of the state as comprised of interest groups and individuals is abandoned to allow Wendt to argue that the state is an actor. Last semester, and undoubtedly in our personal research, we were exposed to a number of theories that demonstrated how divisions within the state impact on international outcomes--consider, for example, Putnam's theory of two-level games. While Wendt makes allows for states of different types, he clings to the idea that states are unitary, arguing that systemic theories of international relations must leave the internal composition of states unexamined (p. 244). Putnam's theory indicates that these internal divisions have important effects at the level of interactions between states (Wendt's micro-structural level).
This oversight/omission seems to relate to the "multiple realizability" argument Wendt makes against reductionism (p. 152), asserting that many combinations of lower level properties/interactions will result in the same macro-level outcome. On the next page, he argues that attention to micro-foundations can lead to a failure to see or explain important things that are not reducible to the micro-level. I can accept this argument, and yet Wendt seems to take the argument too far with his states-as-unitary-actors approach--attention to the macro-level should not be used to discard all micro-foundational analyses, and these may help scholars explain and understand processes. It seems that valuable complexity is being lost through exclusive attention to the macro-structure. The need I see is for stronger bridges between the micro-structure and the macro-structure.
Finally, as more of a curiosity than a concern, I wondered if Wendt's three cultures of anarchy could be applied at other levels-of-analysis characterized by anarchy, such as failed states. I'm also playing with the idea that certain post-conflict societies are in a liminal period that mirrors conditions of anarchy. Could we see these societies as characterized by Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian anarchic culture? My initial instinct is that concepts apply, but that further work is needed. I was also wondering to what extent we could say that different aspects of the international system have different cultures of anarchy--the global economy might be seen as Lockean, for example, while the security situation is mired in Hobbesian anarchy. Any thoughts?
One of the most problematic aspects of Wendt's argument, for me, was his conception of the state as a unitary actor. While his conception of the state (p. 201) claims to combine elements of the organizational (Weberian), reductive (pluralist), and structural (Marxist) theories of the state, the pluralist conception of the state as comprised of interest groups and individuals is abandoned to allow Wendt to argue that the state is an actor. Last semester, and undoubtedly in our personal research, we were exposed to a number of theories that demonstrated how divisions within the state impact on international outcomes--consider, for example, Putnam's theory of two-level games. While Wendt makes allows for states of different types, he clings to the idea that states are unitary, arguing that systemic theories of international relations must leave the internal composition of states unexamined (p. 244). Putnam's theory indicates that these internal divisions have important effects at the level of interactions between states (Wendt's micro-structural level).
This oversight/omission seems to relate to the "multiple realizability" argument Wendt makes against reductionism (p. 152), asserting that many combinations of lower level properties/interactions will result in the same macro-level outcome. On the next page, he argues that attention to micro-foundations can lead to a failure to see or explain important things that are not reducible to the micro-level. I can accept this argument, and yet Wendt seems to take the argument too far with his states-as-unitary-actors approach--attention to the macro-level should not be used to discard all micro-foundational analyses, and these may help scholars explain and understand processes. It seems that valuable complexity is being lost through exclusive attention to the macro-structure. The need I see is for stronger bridges between the micro-structure and the macro-structure.
Finally, as more of a curiosity than a concern, I wondered if Wendt's three cultures of anarchy could be applied at other levels-of-analysis characterized by anarchy, such as failed states. I'm also playing with the idea that certain post-conflict societies are in a liminal period that mirrors conditions of anarchy. Could we see these societies as characterized by Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian anarchic culture? My initial instinct is that concepts apply, but that further work is needed. I was also wondering to what extent we could say that different aspects of the international system have different cultures of anarchy--the global economy might be seen as Lockean, for example, while the security situation is mired in Hobbesian anarchy. Any thoughts?
posted by Anonymous at 11:07 PM
1 Comments:
Sheesh! Sorry to hear about the fainting spell Hetman. I'm sure you'll be back in the saddle in no time, or squatting around your dung campfire, generally being a blood-drinking tribal savage. And there's my segue to Wendt...
Wendt, in my reading, is a kind of constructivist KKV. No, really: this is an assimilativist project, explicitly so when it comes to Waltz and more so than the already parasitic non-radical constructivist project found elsewhere (I mean, he has a host of unkind words for the poor neo-libs thanks to their reliance on realist structuralism; I'm not sure how a constructivist manages to deride others on these terms and not extend the same criticisms to their own school, but irregardless). Anyway, I don't have any particular thoughts on the homogenous state problem, although I recognize the power of my colleagues' posts; what I want to discuss is Wendt-as-assimilativist. Look, he says rationalists and constructivists disagree on the primacy of ideas, and that his idea is to show that interests ARE ideas [95-6], but while his hope is that this will inform his overall 'everyone's a constructivist basically' motivation, it seems to me that he is assuming that the same kind of arguments are seen as legitimate by both rationalists and constructivists - is this true? It seems to me that rats and cons disagree at two different levels: cons claim that rats are using fatuous, implict-favourite, hypothesis-serving metaphysical claims to make their research provide the output they want it to (essentially, a matter on disagreement about legitimacy of INPUT) while rats have the attitude that con work is frivolous and doesn't provide predictive 'real-world' tools (legitimacy of OUTPUT). KKV and Wendt aside, are these people ever going to agree?
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