Searle's two books, or the brute facticity of a screwdriver
Lots going on in Searle's book, of course, but by way of opening up our discussion on Tuesday let me make two points which I'll elaborate in class (and in part my elaboration will be fueled by whatever comments get posted before class begins, so feel free to react before class):
1) Searle maintains that his account of social reality, which is centrally concerned with the importance of intentional social action and the intensional (note the very VERY important distinction between intentional-with-a-t and intensional-with-an-s here; for details see he footnote on p. 18) character of functional attributions, makes no sense without a notion of brute facts underlying the various actions and procedures that make up the invisible ontology of the social world. The discussion of the screwdrivers on pp. 9-12 is important here, since Searle uses this discussion to conclude that "intrinsic features of reality are those that exist independently of all mental states, except for mental states themselves." The screwdriver's being-a-screwdriver is observer-relative, but the screwdriver also has intrinsic properties that do not add up to its being a screwdriver -- since that status depends on intentional social action, whether deliberate or not.
The question is: do we need both of these points? For the study of the social world, in which functional attributions are intensional-with-an-s and in which intentional-with-a-t social action produces and reproduces the apparent solidity and stability of social facts, do we need brute facts at all? Searle maintains that social facts are both ontologically subjective and epistemically objective; does that argument depend on accepting the brute fact/social fact distinction and interdependency, or is it logically separate?
2) provisionally accepting Searle's account of social facts as inextricably intertwined with intentional social action (and, parenthetically, <i>ongoing</i> social action -- there does not seem to be any "tipping point" in Searle beyond which a social fact takes on a solid and self-sustaining life of its own), how should we study the social world? Searle's account of brute facts is clearly and unequivocally dualist, separating mind from world and seeking the truth-value of statements in the procedure of disquotation (see pp. 201ff for an elaboration). But given the observer-relative character of social facts, how do we go about studying them meaningfully? Does it matter that all of Searle's examples in chapters 7-9 of the book are about brute facts rather than social facts?
1) Searle maintains that his account of social reality, which is centrally concerned with the importance of intentional social action and the intensional (note the very VERY important distinction between intentional-with-a-t and intensional-with-an-s here; for details see he footnote on p. 18) character of functional attributions, makes no sense without a notion of brute facts underlying the various actions and procedures that make up the invisible ontology of the social world. The discussion of the screwdrivers on pp. 9-12 is important here, since Searle uses this discussion to conclude that "intrinsic features of reality are those that exist independently of all mental states, except for mental states themselves." The screwdriver's being-a-screwdriver is observer-relative, but the screwdriver also has intrinsic properties that do not add up to its being a screwdriver -- since that status depends on intentional social action, whether deliberate or not.
The question is: do we need both of these points? For the study of the social world, in which functional attributions are intensional-with-an-s and in which intentional-with-a-t social action produces and reproduces the apparent solidity and stability of social facts, do we need brute facts at all? Searle maintains that social facts are both ontologically subjective and epistemically objective; does that argument depend on accepting the brute fact/social fact distinction and interdependency, or is it logically separate?
2) provisionally accepting Searle's account of social facts as inextricably intertwined with intentional social action (and, parenthetically, <i>ongoing</i> social action -- there does not seem to be any "tipping point" in Searle beyond which a social fact takes on a solid and self-sustaining life of its own), how should we study the social world? Searle's account of brute facts is clearly and unequivocally dualist, separating mind from world and seeking the truth-value of statements in the procedure of disquotation (see pp. 201ff for an elaboration). But given the observer-relative character of social facts, how do we go about studying them meaningfully? Does it matter that all of Searle's examples in chapters 7-9 of the book are about brute facts rather than social facts?
posted by ProfPTJ at 11:20 AM
6 Comments:
I am going to preface these comments with the disclaimer that I still have a long evening of reading ahead of me, so these questions may be answered in subsequent chapts of the book. Regardless, just to throw a few things out there...
I found myself wondering about the extent to which institutional facts need to line up with/correspond to brute facts, particularly when power is a determinant of what becomes an institutional fact. There are instances when it is in the interest of certain powers to establish a "false" relationship between X and Y (in X counts as Y in C). To give a somewhat weird example, in Ecuador, there is a government-sponsored tourist spot that is supposedly exactly on the equator which is referred to as "mitad del mundo" (center of the world). You take a bus there and there is a big statue and all of these government-sponsored shops selling mitad del mundo junk. When GPS was developed, it became clear that this spot was a good quarter mile off of the equator. Yet the Ecuadorian government has continued insisting that it is on the equator, and people continue to visit this spot (to the total frustration of the independent little museum that was created at the real mitad del mundo a few years ago). Mitad del mundo is an institutional fact that is misaligned with the brute fact with which it supposedly corresponds (point on the equator). Such misalignments seem very common in society, some more pernicious than others (thinking about Searle's reference to war that is not recognized as such, I thought about the Gulf of Tonkin attack that never was). So what connects brute facts and institutional facts if they do not really have to line up? Could the powers that exist just continue to create new institutional facts that increase/ augment their power?
I also was thinking about what social processes must be involved for people to collectively accept something as an institutional fact. Back in college (a million years ago) we read Durkheim's work on the way that things come to be collectively considered "sacred." I have a foggy recollection of his outlining a type of social ritual that generated a collective emotional state that is important for the conversion of some every day object into something recognized as sacred (a "totem"). Thinking about Searle's explanation of marriavge, even if the "speech act" of the marriage ceremony is what technically creates the new institutional fact of two people's marriage, a marriage has certain collective emotions associated with it that give meaning to the words uttered--this seems important in terms of establishing this new institutional fact, no?
Just a quick response to Annie's interesting comment. I think that it is possible to view the “mitad del mundo” example in a way that conforms to Searle's point about the necessity of brute facts underlying institutional ones. While the positioning of the tourist attraction was inaccurate regarding the equator, the existence of the equator, nevertheless, is still a brute fact. Without the existence of the brute fact of the equator's existence, “mitad del mundo” would not exist. One could say a similar thing about the Gulf of Tonkin “Incident”. While the actually reported torpedo attack may not have actually happened, the incident, although inaccurately represented, was still predicated on the brute fact that real military attacks do sometimes happen. Therefore, I do not think that because institutional facts are sometimes inaccurately based on brute facts, this necessarily undercuts Searle's argument.
However, to come back the earlier point about the “mitad del mundo,” perhaps a related example that is truly not based on any brute facts is the Greenwich Observatory located on the prime meridian outside London. Unlike the equator, which is a brute fact, the prime meridian exist only as an institutional fact (at least as far as I can see). This, however, does not seem to lessen the scads of tourists who show up there each year.
I want to first comment on ProfPTJ's parenthetical note regarding the "tipping" point at which a social fact takes on a self-sustaining life of its own, because this was where, in my mind (ha), Searle did not deliver on his promises.
He attempts in chapters four and five to explore the "possibilities and limitations" (90) of the system in which we socially create institutions that take on a life of their own (his best example is the creation of the institution of money). But I moved into chapter six feeling unsatisfied. Certainly, I understood a great deal more about the process by which institutional facts, or status functions, are created. What I was hoping for, however, was the elusive predictive power.
For example, is it possible for health care to become a universal right in the US (we all probably have some gut political reaction to this, but I'm asking in terms of the application of the process by which something becomes an institutionalized fact that has shed its fragility and takes on a life of its own)?
I realize that my desire to apply Searle to this issue is exactly what Weber warns against in The Vocation Lectures. Perhaps this is my own idealism, or my own wishful thinking about philosophy. But I have the sense that Searle is trying to make his exercise relevant to not only our lives but relevant to bigger, more substantive questions as well. He is trying to make us consider the effect of human agency on reality (Annie, I loved your example of the "mitad del mundo"). I wanted him to take one step further and move from equipping his readers with a lens through which and tools with which to think about the world, to describing how to apply this to larger questions.
Perhaps it's asking too much.
But the central question that would be of interest to me is the all-practical, "how do I use this?"
I have one peripheral thought that is perhaps more in line with ProfPTJ's first question. When I was in Kenya, I noticed that the gardeners where I stayed were cutting the grass with machetes. They had lawn mowers, my friend explained to me, but the lawn mowers were imported. When the lawn mowers broke down there was no one with the lawn mower knowledge to fix them. The Kenyan gardeners therefore used the instrument with which they were more familiar.
To explain this tableau, I need both brute facts and the social reality. To borrow ProfPTJ's sentence construction: the lawnmower being a lawnmower is observer-relative, but its intrinsic properties (which do not add up to its being a lawnmower) render it useless. The fact that it is broken means that no amount of social construction of the lawnmower will make it work. I don't know that I am being as clear as I could be here, but my thought is that we need both. I think this point is important to Searle's argument.
(On a different note, in full disclosure, I had not realized the distinction between intentional-with-a-t and intensional-with-an-s before I was directed toward the footnote in this post. My subsequent exploration of the difference between the two cleared up some of my confusion. Thanks for pointing it out.)
Darn Searle, now I can't stop thinking about this division between institutional and brute facts.
So I read on my hand soap, "We relentlessly seek out organic ingredients." Besides this statement being way cheesy and overly dramatic, this soap is not actually certified as organic. My hand soap company is trying to make X (cheapest materials they could buy mixed together) count as Y (organic). And isn't that largely what the whole industry of marketing is about? Blurring the line between brute facts (thing you bought) and status-imbued institutional facts (ideals of fashion, coolness, etc)? And then there is lobbying where, in the case of organics, you try to fiddle with the parameters of what counts as Y (organic)in a way that it maintains its status/privileges (people will pay more) but so that your X (whatever you produce in the cheapest way possible) can still count.
Anyway, I think one of you who chose (or was chosen by) science as a vocation should write a book about the relationship between social reality and brute facts. (Mind the Gap: Exploring the Limits of Ontologically Subjective Reality, by Kate Tennis. :))
Let me try to use Annie's last point about marketing as a launchpad and summarize my thoughts after reading Searle (and as that was not enough some book reviews, and two articles by Barry Smith on Searle).
When we used the example of WMDs and their role in Iraqi War, as a selfish PhD student, I started to think about the implications of Searle's account on my research. As some of you might now, my main research interest is on public opinion and political communication, specifically on nation/place branding and public diplomacy. I'll try to talk about (i) poltiical communication (ii) Iraqi War example and (iii) place/nation branding
Now, the fundamental rhetorical principles praise the virtue of truth - yet, contemporary mass persuasion methods do not necessarily depend on a brute fact. If somehow, the masses can be made to believe something exists, it does. (In Searle's terms, there is a Y in context C because I'm telling you so). Lippmann, for instance, talks about the existence of two worlds (not in an ontological context): the real world vs. the picture in our heads (our perception). These two worlds are not necessarily the same and individuals tend to act according to the latter rather than the former.
In the case of Iraqi War, if you see WMDs statement as a tool to create fear (and indirectly to gather support for a war), the brute fact is incredibly unnecessary. I just need a Y - a fear factor. I can create it through non-existing/manipulated/ever-changing Xs or just create an environment of fear.
Nation branding, similarly, aims to create an image of a nation in target audience's mind. As Annie mentions, the process aims to make "Aruba" your friend, "Iceland" producer of natural products, "Qatar" a hospitable country etc. Again, these brand identities are socially created through language, and does not necessarily require brute facts to support their existence.
Shortly speaking, I don't want to claim that there are free-standing Ys in the social reality but some Ys are pretty loosely connected to the Xs.
PS: The discussion, for some reason, kept reminding me of Woody Allen's Love and Death. You should definitely see the movie if you haven't. Here is a sample dialogue:
Sonja: Boris, Let me show you how absurd your position is. Let's say there is no God, and each man is free to do exactly as he chooses. What prevents you from murdering somebody?
Boris: Murder's immoral.
Sonja: Immorality is subjective.
Boris: Yes, but subjectivity is objective.
Sonja: Not in a rational scheme of perception.
Boris: Perception is irrational. It implies immanence.
Sonja: But judgment of any system or a priori relation of phenomena exists in any rational or metaphysical or at least epistemological contradiction to an abstracted empirical concept such as being or to be or to occur in the thing itself or of the thing itself.
Boris: Yeah, I've said that many times.
I was intrigued by the question on whether we need brute facts to study social world and like Efe, it got me thinking what were the brute facts surrounding my topic of interest and how important were they for my research. For example, the natural disaster that affected South Asia in 2004 is a brute fact – it is a brute fact that there was an underwater earthquake that caused a powerful tidal wave that inflicted tremendous damages on five countries.
Yet most of the research that I’ve read by social scientists on this case is focused on the belief that there is nothing natural about the extent of the destruction, as this research believes that the reason why this disaster (and other natural disasters) was SO destructive is because it affected areas that were already political, economically and socially vulnerable. Therefore this research believes that the presence of the brute fact is beside the point and in fact serves only as a mechanism that uncovers – perhaps a better word is exposed – the pre-existing vulnerabilities. And it is these vulnerabilities or social facts that are what needs to be studied.
However, I don’t think this means that we can totally ignore brute facts; they are out there and present in the world – I could try to ignore the brute fact of a tsunami but that’d just be plain silly. But I do think that the research I am interested in is those things that are social facts.
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