A game in which there are more questions than answers
When I look at my computer screen, I see a series of lines and dots. Or, rather, that is what I should say. I don't see something as a series of dots. That would be ridiculous. Well, actually what my mind tells me is that I see a series of words, contextualized in sentences, and ordered into paragraphs.
This is interesting--what I see and what I perceive. Like Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit (a word I am sure is more robust in the German) example, I know that we perceive things in different ways. Does it matter that we perceive them in different ways?
Let's take another example:
What do you see here? What do you see this photo as? Does how you see it or how I see it change the meaning of the picture? Look again. Do you see something different? Does its meaning depend on how you see it?
And what is meaning? How is meaning of words determined? How can we even discuss how meanings of words are determined if we are, ourselves, using words themselves for such a purpose?
Before my fingers begin to type, I reason to myself. Should I choose this word or that one? What will this word mean versus that one? But if I do not say this out loud, or if I do not type it, I have not communicated it. Before I “reasoned,” I had to know what “reasoning” is, and therefore, I had to learn how to reason in my head only by learning to reason (Wittgenstein 220).
And what about pain? Can we objectively understand pain, or is it merely subject to our own experience? Is there such a thing as objective pain? If there is not such a thing as objective pain, then should I just stare passively if someone is writhing on the floor, crying and grimacing?
I am inevitably left, after a reading of Section II of Philosophical Investigations, with more questions than answers...
(And since my questions are internal, and stated within my head as I read them, are they valid questions? Are they only valid when I write them down in this blog entry?)
...which, I am coming to experience,...
(I purposely say experience, because rather than trying to simply make me understand, Wittgenstein makes me experience what he is trying to convey.)
is the point.
With a more critical view of language, taking into account ontological "reality," and epistemological "subjectivity," my view of the world shifts to an expending--no, a shattering--of the boundaries and boxes that I had previously constructed for myself. It is in this space that Wittgenstein dares me to begin to be creative in my reasoning. It is in this space that he challenges me to keep trying until I realize that, while it might be futile, the activity of language is... well... just is.
My one question here, which can be discussed in the comments, is what assumptions has the experience of Wittgenstein shattered for you?
posted by SonjaKelly at 9:09 PM
5 Comments:
Ahh, Welcome to MY world!!!!
It is interesting to me: I wanted to hate Wittgenstein because he was a self-centered bastard with father issues and in desperate need of a good therapist, but I find that what he writes makes a lot of sense to me. (Does this mean that crazy people tend to understand each other more... disturbing thought).
In my past, I trained as an artist, and I was taught to look at things critically. One of my favorite exercises was to look at a 'white' wall and SEE what colors were there - ie, we were not allowed to use any white in the representation of the white wall. Of course, the colors I saw depended on the type of light, etc. But the point of the exercise is to "shatter" (as Sonja says) the categorical boxes we are socialized into.
So does that mean that if you see 'white' and I see 'red/blue with a hint of purple', we are looking at two different walls, or is it the same wall and two different sets of eyes and experiences?
Does it matter?
Wittgenstein reminds me of that Habermas essay we read on distorted communication. Except here, consensus isn't the issue. Like Sonja's reference to the subjectivity of pain, it seems Wittgenstein is asking (or, rather, I am left asking...) if it even matters whether two people experience pain differently or express themselves differently. It matters perhaps when there is miscommunication, which presupposes that there is an acceptable base definition to which society as a whole generally agrees (I am reminded of Wit's comments on the color red). This then leads me to Foucault and the 'power' associated with the social definition of things like 'sane' and 'crazy' etc. ... And I find that I do not necessarily subscribe to social tenets (even language, though I am much more enamored with words), but I understand the difference between acceptable (by social standards) and my views. For instance, I don't believe 'to journal' should be a verb. It is retarded. And yet, I understand it when a therapist suggests it to me. But I digress.
Finally, in answer to Sonja's parting question, I find myself thinking, well duh! to a lot of this. Thinking about it more deeply, it occurs to me that I feel this way because my socially constructed categorical boxes (like what constitutes propriety, acceptable sharing, what is OK, what is bad) were shattered long ago when I was forced into therapy. Perhaps this is why I am persistently (and annoyingly) bringing it up both in class and social situations. The experience has had a profound effect on how I perceive the world I'm in, my place in it, and what I now view as valid. Its like being forced to see the color in white walls, but on a far larger universal scale.
anyways... just my morning thoughts.
I would also like to add that it took me FOREVER to see the old woman in the picture. I kept just seeing the young one. wishful thinking much?
Following our class discussion, I would like to clarify that through this post I am not asserting a private language game, but rather a voicing of our own experience as an effort to co-construct the meaning of Wittgenstein within our own class language game.
When I ask, therefore, how Wittgenstein has shattered boundaries for you (ontological, epistemological, or otherwise), it comes from the recognition that without the co-(re)construction of the meaning that we acknowledge in our interaction with Wittgenstein, I would be lost (And my musings about what exactly it means and what exactly I can take from it would be meaningless. Or, rather, meaning-less.).
Discuss.
Wittgenstein has unzipped my straightjacket. The "straightjacket" I was wearing was the notion that social scientific research must look a certain way and do certain things to be legit. The concept of family resemblences is powerful. I can see how in many instances it is better to analyze related phenomena in terms of family ressemblances rather than defining sine qua non essentialist qualities.
As Wittgenstein points out, some questions don't make sense and will only take you down the wrong path. So, for example, we may be misled by the question, "What are the essential characteristics of revolutions?" or even "What are the (universal) causes of revolutions?"
I will go further and suggest that it does not always make sense to ask what the "average" revolution is like, in much the same way that it doesn't make sense to ask what the "average" Rossmiller is like or what the "average" social security number in America is.
Family resemblances, people. Family resemblances.
One quick thing about duck&rabbit, old&young women pictures. Actually those drawings are drawings of a crudely drawn duck and rabbit and a weird combination of old and young women. How we approach the picture, where our eyes are focused - change our perspective. If I am to take this physical approach and use it in social science research, I can come up with two conclusions: 1- I can claim that the way we approach issues fundamentally alter our subject of study. 2- I can claim that we need to take a step out of the society and take an 'objective' look to see the big picture. Which one of these will cause Wittgenstein to smack himself on the forehead?
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