Of Identities and National Interests
I like Charlotte Epstein's book first because she forces us to confront what – at least most of – probably consider to be common sense: that hunting whales is wrong! While her book has not made me a supporter of the whale hunt, it has made me realise that many of our “rational” reasons for disagreeing with the hunt are not quite as well founded as we might have believed. It also make us (re)confront the idea that norms are indeed socially constructed.
Whaling aside, Epstein presents an excellent example of how identity (both of individuals and states) has influence in international relations. Realist conceptions of IR speak almost entirely in terms of “state interests.” If it is in a state's interest to do something then it will do it. If a state views it to be in its interest to hunt whales then it would do so. Conversely, if it were in its national interests to become an anti-whaling state, then it would do so also. Epstein clearly demonstrates that national identity often plays a significant role is determining exactly what constitutes a state's “interests.”
An example related to Epstein's work is that of the Canadian seal hunt. The revenue generated by the infamous harp seal hunt in eastern Canada is small in comparison to the problems it creates with regards to trade embargos in Europe and elsewhere. In a realist view, Ottawa should end the seal hunt immediately. Instead the Canadian government recently began serving seal meat in the parliamentary restaurant. Why? Because the seal hunt is viewed as part of the identity of Atlantic Canada (particularly Newfoundland). Even though this is only a small part of the country overall, in this case, regional identity has trumped broader national economic considerations.
That is all well and good for whales and seals, but what about more (in a realist view) important things, like national security? An IR constructivist could point to the 1997 land-mine ban treaty. Despite being very militarily effective weapons, following a worldwide campaign, 133 countries signed a treaty banning the construction and use of land mines. The signatory states decided that their identities as countries that did not use these terrible maiming weapons trumped any national security interests.
Of course a realist retort might be that twelve years after it came into effect, only 40 of the 133 countries that signed the Landmine Ban Treaty have actually ratified it. Furthermore, the countries that have not signed the treaty are the ones that make and/or use most of the world's landmines: namely the US, China, Russia, India, North and South Korea, and Israel.
What about weapons of far more significance than landmines -- nuclear weapons. At around the same time that the anti-whaling movement was gaining support, another movement, this one about the morality of possessing nuclear weapons, was also becoming prominent. Despite an anti-nuclear campaign that was far louder than the anti-whaling one, there was (and still is) almost no chance that the nuclear-armed states will decide to the relinquish their destructive capabilities (with the unique exception of South Africa).
While identities can and do shape national interests, this is only in cases where more fundamental interests, such as state security, are not gravely threatened.
Finally, Epstein's discussion of how the Maori people carve up beached whales appears to be a far better idea than what they tried to do with a whale carcass in Oregon:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZFwxH3PPWiU
posted by Eddy at 8:24 PM
1 Comments:
Norms versus Discourse
Eddy makes reference to norms—and so does Epstein. She takes pains to distinguish the constructivist study of norms in international relations from the study of discourse as she conducts it. In the IR literature, “to acquire legitimacy new studies of international politics need only specify which of the three—power, interests, or ideas—they are positing as their independent variable. My argument here is that the terms of the debate are still set within a positivist framework that is inherently geared toward approaching all factors as material factors, or quasi-essences” (8). Some consequences of this are a tendency among constructivists addressing “norms” to “evacuate power,” and as a result, these scholars overlook “nonmaterial, discursive forms of power.” Continuing, she explains that by power she does not merely mean the power to persuade as is described in the discussion of norms, but “having no choice but to talk (and act) in a certain way, because other ways of talking about the issue have been actively evacuated.” Our social worlds, Epstein explains, are not merely constructed (in which case they could have been constructed in other ways), but “their construction has excluded other possible sets of articulations or meanings. The prevailing of one particular social construct is an effect of power” (9).
Epstein has a compelling point here about power—once a certain discourse takes hold, it has the effect of marginalizing or even demonizing those who do not adopt a “subject-position” within it. She also has a good point about positivism and linear causation—the constructivist IR literature takes ideas as an important independent variable in place of material interests, instead of seeing how power and discourses are intimately intertwined. It is hard to sort out an x from a y: it is too simple to say power causes a discourse or discourses cause power—both contain some truth but are inadequate statements of the relationship between discourse and power.
As a practical matter, however, when we turn to Eddy’s examples of strong norms in IR, such as the norm against land mines, I am still struggling to understand the different consequences of taking a discourse approach versus a norms approach. The norms literature refers to a stage of norm “internalization,” in which it becomes hard to imagine not behaving according to norms and certainly hard to argue against the norm. Hence the power of norms can be comparable to the power of an entrenched discourse. Similarly, the power relations that bring about norms and help institutionalize them seem to be acknowledged in IR constructivism. In other words, both literatures seem to agree that there is not a simple “norms → behavior” linear causation and that the ideas (discourse/norms) and power are interrelated.
I will be continuing to think through these two approaches as we move forward.
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