Saturday, March 19, 2011

Let's Talk about Sex...

In History of Sexuality (1990), Foucault charts the analytics of power surrounding sex and how sex has become a scientia sexualis in Western culture. Foucault details how instead of the usual belief that our society was once sexually repressed in the olden days and is now becoming more sexually liberated, it is in fact trapped in the power of discourse that has relegated sex to a dangerous secret that everyone knows about. Since we could not talk about sex directly, we could only justify talking about it in terms of it as a medical problem – “perversions” such as masturbation, the hysterical woman and homosexuality.


How can we use Foucault’s History on Sexuality as a heuristic device to understand contemporary matters related to sex and power? His argument seems most easily related to questions connected to feminism and homosexuality. Based off this work, where would a Foucauldian analysis of issues such as rape, abortion, female genital mutilation (FGM) and gay marriage lead us exactly?


To me, it seemed like an interesting gap that Foucault did not talk about rape when talking about sex and power. Rape is power transformed into sexual violence – it has been used as a strategy of warfare, an exercise of dominance. Would Foucault view rape as such? Or am I not heeding Foucault’s advice to break away from the agency of sex and instead again falling for the repression hypothesis? Am I only thinking of sex “in terms of law, prohibition, liberty and sovereignty” (90)? In order to avoid this problem, Foucault suggests that we focus instead on “bodies and pleasures”, but how is that possible when dealing with a subject like rape (157)?


Take the example of the “simple-minded” farmhand who paid little girls for sexual favors (or “inconsequential bucolic pleasures” according to Foucault), and who was then shipped off to a psychiatric institution to be “studied” (31). Foucault seemed to be a bit saddened about the farmhand’s fate and used this as an instance of how the state controls sex as a scientific subject. While I do think that there is some truth to how sexual “perversions” have been controlled by institutions of knowledge and power, I still think I would see the farmhand as committing statutory rape – a perspective that Foucault did not seem to address. However, even as I write it out, I realize that the definition of statutory rape was created by the state – so am I still falling into the trap of imbuing sex with a repressive power? If that is the case, does that mean that we should only view rape as an act of violence, and completely separated from sexuality? Isn’t such a view problematic?


Continuing on this idea of sex, power and women, is the controversy over abortion a sign of how the state and parts of the public wish to exercise control over a woman’s body? What about FGM – is this a cultural practice or another form of power wielded over women to manage their bodies, sexuality and their ability to experience pleasure? FGM is sometimes promoted by women themselves – is this an example of how power and sex has been diffused throughout discourse so that it has become internalized?


Can we view Foucault’s discussion on how the political economy of population became a dominant aspect of the discourse around sex – to be controlled, monitored, and kept within the realm of the mother-father bedroom – as one of the reasons why gay marriage is still struggling to be legal in the States? If masturbation is a problem because the solitary pleasure does not lead to babies, then that argument could be extended to gay marriage, for if sex is for procreation only, then same sex relationships do not fit the bill. But what would Foucault think about the gay rights movement in general? If we take the view that the movement is operating on a platform of sexual orientation, is it in fact “part of the same historical network as the thing it denounces (and doubtless misrepresents) by calling it ‘repression’?” (10). In a sense, is the movement using the same language that tried to repress it in the first place?


As you can see, I have a lot of questions about Foucault’s analysis of power, sex and discourse. While at first the idea that power is a pervasive force throughout society is a compelling one, when trying to see how I can free myself from this repressive idea of sex, especially when it came to rape, I found myself more confused than illuminated.

Labels: , , , ,

4 Comments:

Blogger Annie said...

Yes, Namalie, I also found it disturbing that in a book focused on issues of power and sexuality, the issue of rape is not seriously discussed. Foucault seems to romanticize sex in a way that misses the often perverse power relations between partners.

To delve a little deeper into the account of the farm hand and the little girl from whom he "receives a few caresses" in a game called "curdled milk" (and I think we can use our imaginations there...), Foucault writes:

"The pettiness of it all. The fact that this everyday occurrence in the life of village sexuality, these inconsequential bucolic pleasures, could become, from a certain time, the object not only of a collective intolerance but of a judicial intervention, a medical intervention, a careful clinical examination, and an entire theoretical elaboration" (p. 31). And etc, etc about the ways that the institutions of power and knowledge have come to "overlay this everyday bit of theater with their solemn discourse" (p. 32).

This does not sound like a case of village life's "inconsequential bucolic pleasures" inconveniently interrupted by the overextended reach of the institutions of power and knowledge. Rather: a child was molested and fortunately the state intervened to prevent this from happening again.

Sex is often about an abuse of power. Men have power--children and women don't. Women are raped, children are molested, and perhaps most disturbingly, these acts generally go unreported and unpunished. As in the case above, such abuses are often considered a natural part of life. When the guy "had a few too many" and the girl was dressed like she was "asking for it," date rape is just "boys being boys."

Thankfully, in my mind, the authoritative power of the state has expanded to the extent that, in some cases, it curbs the power of individuals in carrying out sexual abuse. This is not a case of power extending into the formerly idyllically unregulated realm of "natural" sexual life, as Foucault seems to suggest. Sexuality has always been a web of power relations. The modern institutions of power and knowledge do not overlay "everyday bits of theater" with their solemn discourse, but rather overlay, and only in some cases intervene in, an existing web of power relations that mediates human sexual encounters. This is, on the whole, a good thing. The institutions of "collective intolerance, judicial intervention, medical intervention" etc that constitute the public sphere of societal power have the capacity to prevent the widespread private abuse of power in sexual relationships.

10:33 AM  
Anonymous Ela said...

I'm with you, Annie.

In the spirit of Foucault, let's analyze his own discursive power.

According to Foucault, power/knowledge is made manifest in discourse, and so the only way to resist power is to name the dominant discourse and to offer an alternative discourse.

He names the dominant discourse as one that is overly preoccupied with the "technology of sex."

He offers an alternative discourse that says we should all just lighten up. In the example raised by Namlie and Annie (which I also found disturbing), Foucault proposes that rather than intervening, examining, medicalizing, and punishing child molestors, the state should turn its attention to other matters.

Foucault has a stake in the issue because he himself was accused of child molestation. So, this book is his chance to get back at the system by proposing an alternative discourse that says, "Look at how over-sexed and petty society is," and "Leave child molesters alone and let us do what we want."

So, what power/knowledge is manifest in Foucault's discourse? It is the power/knowledge that says "I'm going to tell this story from the point of view of the farmhand, not the children. Also, I'm not going to account for rape in my theorization of power, even though this is a common experience for many women."

Is this the discourse that will move us forward? Is this the discourse that will liberate us? Or is this simply a discourse of revenge that attacks everything but affirms nothing?

11:09 AM  
Blogger TAW said...

Considering yesterday's discussion of how discourse at once challenges and reinforces power, I would like to add that perhaps, we as actors within a system or social sphere at once use power as a tool and are tools of power.

Looking at people as tools and users of tools creates an interesting image of rape and its aftermath. Those who rape, assault, molest, etc are using their relative power over others to, guess what?, feel powerful when they may feel robbed of it in other ways. For survivors of sexual assault, the prescriptive approach for dealing with the trauma is quite foucauldian. As a supporter you are expected to be conscientious of your own conception of what is good and right without imposing those ideas on the person reaching out to you for help (which has its own inherent power dynamic in the relationship).

So a survivor who engages in "self destructive behavior" as a coping mechanism (cutting, alcoholism, promiscuous sexual activity, lashing out angrily at those uninvolved with the trauma, etc) are not to be chided for having a "wrong" response, but instead supported for the release it provides them and the exercise of the power of being able to choose.

However, where this strategy get interesting is at the point of where the state intervenes in the "there is no wrong response to rape meme". So destructive behaviors are acceptable... until a person appears to be ready to harm themselves (suicide) or others (child abuse, murder, sexual violation of children). In those instances, I'd have a legal responsibility to intervene. While I recognize and accept that preserving the safety of others has become an important function of the state (though curiously this is in practice not often the case for women in general and survivors of abuse and assault specifically), I can also see that this act reinforces state power by centralizing the coercive right to regulate such activity, or the prevention and punishment of such activity in one place.

Removing from this discussion my own sense of compassion for those who feel like they no longer want to live, and my predisposition to want to save the world, I think Foucault would have misgivings about the power of the state even over the individual's body. Why is it that I'm legally required to report someone who wants to end their own life? What utility is living for someone who no longer wants to? Isn't that the ultimate exercise of power over oneself?

5:11 AM  
Blogger Suzanne said...

We have now discussed rape and the game of “curdled milk.” I pick up Namalie’s mention of FGM (an abbreviation I did not know existed). This practice has been variously labeled (and this is just in English) female circumcision, clitoridectomy, and now female genital mutilation. The shifting of terms reflects the evolution of the discourses on this topic.

The term “female circumcision,” which obscures the extent of the cutting done to the girls who undergo it, reflects a discourse that treats the practice as tolerable, if somewhat foreign. (The unmodified noun “circumcision” clearly relates to boys, so the more foreign practice gets the adjective “female.”) This is consistent with a worldview that sees female sexuality as dangerous. This seems not too different from the Victorian ethos Foucault describes in which all sexual practices not leading to procreation were treated medically and legally as perversions.

Today, however, the term “female genital mutilation” reflects another discourse: the discourse of international development, which views the practice as a misogynist and violent horror that must be abolished. (I happen to agree with this discourse, but it is a discourse nonetheless.) The medical-sounding “clitoridectomy” was commonly used about 20 years ago, when I studied the subject a bit at the American University in Cairo. It is somewhat more neutral-sounding than “mutilation” but is more revealing than “circumcision”; I would argue, therefore, that it represented a transition from the one discourse to the other.

This is an example of a struggle between two discourses, one of which seems to be prevailing. This raises questions not treated fully by Foucault: Is there only one discourse on a subject at a given time? How does a discourse change? What happens when there are competing discourses? Was not he, in writing The History of Sexuality, trying to change the discourse on sexuality?

These questions recall William Sewell’s work on structure. Structure and agency can coexist, he argues, in part because there is more than one structure in operation at a given time, and they are in flux, and we have some choice in engaging those structures. Structures influence constrain but do not determine our actions and choices. Could not the same be said of discourses?

5:40 PM  

Post a Comment

<< Home