Methodological Diversity (bis)
This is a short follow up on the previous post and ahead of tomorrow's seminar, as revisiting certain parts of this dense text triggered additional reflexions and questions.
The analogy between science and religion made in chapter 7 seems both pertinent and intriguing. Pertinent because in many instances, PTJ offers an authentic exegesis of foundational texts of both IR and philosophy of science, and because he advocates for "tolerance" for the different ways science can be interpreted and knowledge can be generated. It is also intriguing because science is supposed to be somehow antagonistic with religion: as defined here, and following Weber, science should produce a "thoughtful ordering of empirical reality," which is quite different from pure beliefs in forms of spirituality. Yet, the tolerance and acceptation of diversity promoted here imply that researchers are also believers, and while they might be tolerant of other approaches (as religious Christians and Muslims can be tolerant of each other), they probably still believe that their way is the right one.
If we agree with PTJ's typology, this work should help us (and any student of IR) to situate herself/himself in the field and find her/his own identity. The enterprise is even more ambitious because PTJ sometimes reveals to scholars, or their followers, their real identity: some critical realists use the semantic field of neopositivism because they have always evolved in an environment dominated by this philosophical ontology, although it is obviously not theirs. Admirers of Waltz and Carr have ignored, or not noticed, the analyticism and reflexivity, respectively, which characterize their work. As we have seen in the reactions, some contest these categorizations; it is deeply interesting to speculate on the reactions of such authors to PTJ's framework (and it would have been fantastic to have those).
Finally, as PTJ demonstrates, other authors have attempted to shed light on the field's contours and partitions. Their vision was most of the time framed by their own preferences: for instance, Cox's critical theory is opposed to problem-solving theory and has obviously not the same connotation than Mearsheimer's account of critical theory, basically defined as everything that is not neopositivism. What does PTJ's typology tell us about PTJ's preferences of philosophical ontology and methodology?
The analogy between science and religion made in chapter 7 seems both pertinent and intriguing. Pertinent because in many instances, PTJ offers an authentic exegesis of foundational texts of both IR and philosophy of science, and because he advocates for "tolerance" for the different ways science can be interpreted and knowledge can be generated. It is also intriguing because science is supposed to be somehow antagonistic with religion: as defined here, and following Weber, science should produce a "thoughtful ordering of empirical reality," which is quite different from pure beliefs in forms of spirituality. Yet, the tolerance and acceptation of diversity promoted here imply that researchers are also believers, and while they might be tolerant of other approaches (as religious Christians and Muslims can be tolerant of each other), they probably still believe that their way is the right one.
If we agree with PTJ's typology, this work should help us (and any student of IR) to situate herself/himself in the field and find her/his own identity. The enterprise is even more ambitious because PTJ sometimes reveals to scholars, or their followers, their real identity: some critical realists use the semantic field of neopositivism because they have always evolved in an environment dominated by this philosophical ontology, although it is obviously not theirs. Admirers of Waltz and Carr have ignored, or not noticed, the analyticism and reflexivity, respectively, which characterize their work. As we have seen in the reactions, some contest these categorizations; it is deeply interesting to speculate on the reactions of such authors to PTJ's framework (and it would have been fantastic to have those).
Finally, as PTJ demonstrates, other authors have attempted to shed light on the field's contours and partitions. Their vision was most of the time framed by their own preferences: for instance, Cox's critical theory is opposed to problem-solving theory and has obviously not the same connotation than Mearsheimer's account of critical theory, basically defined as everything that is not neopositivism. What does PTJ's typology tell us about PTJ's preferences of philosophical ontology and methodology?
posted by Unknown at 9:53 PM
1 Comments:
Thank you for this thoughtful follow-up post, Manuel! The science/ religion theme we began exploring last week is still very much on my mind. People have been trying to understand this deep relationship between science and spirituality for quite some time of course (think Isaac Newton's alchemical and occultist inclinations and the role they played in his formulation of gravity), though Sandra Harding brought a fresh perspective to the table with her Creationism discussion and the point she makes about "ritual and ceremony" in science.
In the name of scientific plurality, PTJ is asking social scientists to be less dogmatic and more tolerant of each other's philosophical-ontological orientations (which are, as you point out, perhaps more like leaps of faith than like wagers in that one might not have a choice--the belief comes from within!). Harding, on the other hand, while also calling for pluralism, is willing to go where PTJ does not. When she writes that "a training in creationism or intelligent design is not helpful for genetics research," it's almost as if she is asking people of religious faith to set their faith aside in the name of scientific pluralism (148). So, to give Creationists a role, they too must tolerate unsavory viewpoints (e.g.evolutionary biology). PTJ carefully avoids this consideration writing "[w]hether God stands unambiguously for or against particular courses of action is a question that should probably be postponed for another occasion" (189).
I'm also wondering what might distinguish a methodologically sound work from a work of theory. Does a theory need to follow a methodological plan?
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