Sandra Harding (2015) Objectivity and Diversity: Another Logic of Scientific Research

Hello all, since this is a blog post I am going to try to refrain from making the post like an essay, especially since there is so much rich material to engage in. As a bit of background, as an Antioch graduate the main points of the book were my orthodoxy until I got to the quantitative methods class here at SIS, so I tried to read with my critical thinking intact. Harding did a great job of addressing many of my (our?) initial critical thoughts (such as about fair standards opposed to relativism (p.151 or p.33), what groups should or should not be included from a standpoint perspective (p.35) whether these ideas are themselves culturally tied to a Western mindset and concerns (p.44), is Creationism a valid “indigenous knowledge system”? (p.146-148) etc.). So instead I pose some simple questions to start the conversation.

The main claim of the book is: “The social norm of diversity and the epistemic norm of objectivity can provide mutual support for each other” (p.23) or in another phrasing: “The sociopolitical commitment to certain kinds of diversity and the epistemic-scientific commitment to objectivity need not conflict with each other” (p.150). The second phrasing seems closer to her intention, as her discussion of standpoint accounts emphasizes that scientists should start research from “the daily lives of oppressed groups such as women” (p.30) in order to achieve more objective accounts of social relations and nature. Indeed, she contrasts the “weak objectivity” of logical positivism (or we might think of neopositivism in our context?) that un-self-reflexively recreates the dominant perspectives of society by adopting a supposed value free perspective from nowhere with a “strong objectivity” that starts from the daily lives of oppressed groups and promote the “values and interests of anti-authoritarian, pro-democratic social movements” (p.37). The crux of the argument is that diversity and strong objectivity will create more complete and reliable research compared to neopositivism.

The book also highlights how all sciences, including the dominant forms in Western universities, are co-constituted and co-produced with particular societies during particular times. She gives the example of the Vienna School logical positivists who were initially socialist Jews dedicated to anti-fascist research who then promoted a value-free vision of science in response to McCarthyism persecution. Her point is that science is always socially connected and promotes some values, and that scientists can (or should?) align themselves with progressive social movements. Accordingly, scientists should also recognize indigenous sciences as valid types of science and gives several possible strategies to relating to indigenous sciences (although she kept using the phrase indigenous knowledge systems).

Questions

1. What is Sandra Harding’s goal in writing this book?

            I am torn. Part of me reads her book as a call to an acceptance of diverse forms of sciences, as she claims in Chapter 5 (aptly titled “Pluralism, Multiplicity, and the Disunity of Sciences”) that “a ‘world of sciences’ turns out to provide benefits to everyone (p.105). In this sense, her main point seems to agree with PTJ in opening up a diversity of philosophies of science in international relations and for engagement within and across those differences. Chapter 4 on indigenous knowledge systems seems to fit that purpose, as does Ch 6 on the secularism, religion, and mythical components of various sciences being accepted (or fairly engaged with and not dismissed outright).

 On the other hand, chapters 1, 2, and 7 (and spread through other chapters like Ch 5 in smaller pieces) seems to promote a specific kind of science as the most reliable and accurate. In these sections she seems to argue that neopositivism as practiced especially in the U.S. is too narrow and supportive of militaristic and anti-progressive agendas, and that participatory action research or other methods should be aligned with progressive values that support anti-authoritarian, pro-democratic social movements. And that science will be more accurate and representative in this alignment. Perhaps both are goals promoted in the book or I might be reading into various sections, but I’m hoping discussion will be productive around this question and I’m intrigued what others think!

            (It was intriguing the overlap and divergences with the PTJ book since both are commenting on plural sciences. Yet parts of her book seemed so reminiscent of the reflexivity quadrant and yet at points borrowed very mind-world dualist and phenomenalist language, such as pg. 50-51. But maybe that language was employed to prove rhetorical points rather than to suggest an underlying philosophy of science. I also suspect that they use the phrase “philosophy of science” very differently, and their calls for pluralist sciences are distinct, but I can’t quite pin down why I think these things. I digress.)

2. Should there be a specific type of relationship (or balance although I hate to use such an empty term) between Society and Science?

            She makes the great point that all forms of science arise out of and interacts with society during a particular time-period. This co-constitution works through values, funding, types of questions asked, etc. Are her points about Society and Science at all similar to Polanyi’s arguments about markets; markets had been and should be embedded in society and subordinated to politics, religion, and social groups? She claims Science and Society constitute each other, but they also have current relations of a specific type.  So, should science be somewhat distinct from society and drive politics through research with/on that society? Or should political actors drive science? Should only certain groups help drive science? I don’t know, maybe it’s not a helpful comparison or it is too complex a relationship. But if a progressive agenda is part of her scientific vision, it seems important to disentangle. 

3. Is her treatment of Creationism (p.146-148) convincing? How does her treatment of Creationism or Intelligent Design influence your judgement of her wider claims about “strong objectivity,” diversity, and indigenous or spiritual science issues?

            I ask because as I read the book I kept thinking of practical examples to extend her argument, and I kept arriving at Creationism and economically disadvantaged rural whites in the United States. So I was excited she spent some pages addressing the issue, but I’m not sure that I felt fully satisfied by the answer. Her response seems appropriate, and nuanced, and fits with her overall claims, but it still left me unsatisfied and I don’t know why.

Those are my thoughts and confusions. Sorry it is too long.