Analyticism

Weber has a nuanced view of science -- he certainly believes in the contribution of science, but his idea of science seems very different from the predominant everyday usage of the word. In keeping with the common understanding of science, Weber holds that the contributions of science to practical life are in (a) giving technology to control life, (b) contributing tools and methods of thinking, and (c) attaining clarity ("Science as Vocation", pp. 150-151). However, his notion of science differs from most of the authors we’ve read so far in including the social sciences (historical and cultural sciences, sociology, economics, political science and jurisprudence). Also, by emphasizing the role of passion, enthusiasm and inspiration in the generation of ideas, Weber presents a quite different view of science from that of the logical positivists, falsificationists, and scientific naturalists. Further, he holds that scientific progress is only a fraction, though an important one, of the process of intellectualization (p. 138).

Religion and Science: In our discussions in class so far we’ve often used religion as a counterfoil to science to get at the meaning of science. Weber makes a forceful distinction between science and religion in that science is involved in rationalism and intellectualism while religion is based on “emancipation from intellectualism” ("Science as Vocation", pp. 142-143). How far is this distinction correct? It seems to me that religions can be quite intellectual, and that even though they are based on faith they need not exclude rationalism altogether. And in so far as science itself presupposes the value of the knowledge it generates and presupposes the validity of the logic and method that are its tools, is not science similar to religion?

Existential Knowledge: How correct is Weber’s view that there is a distinction between existential knowledge (knowledge of what is) and normative knowledge (knowledge of what should be)? – is existential knowledge as clear or obvious as he assumes? It seems to me that the “reality” that he takes for granted can be questioned. Is there in fact a reality independent of our ability to know it? Weber is taking the external realist (with-a-small-“r”) position here, and contrary to his own position that we must make explicit our hidden assumptions, he is not doing so by implicitly assuming an external reality.

Ideal-Types: Weber’s ideal-types are meant to be models – construction of reality, not reality itself. Ideal-types are meant to give us a clearer understanding of reality. To what extent are ideal-types value-free? Weber writes that ideal-types do not involve judgments of value, and thus there are ideal-types of brothels as well as of religions ("Objectivity in Social Science",pp. 98-99). But is it possible to have a concept that is value-free – doesn’t the ideal-type of capitalism involve the normative aspect of the debilitating effects of the division of labor?