Assigning Function - How to Deal with Biology?

Searle argues that the “assignment of function” (13-23) is one of the elements necessary to understanding the ontology of socially created reality. He argues at great length that there is a key distinction between intrinsic (independent of any mental state) and observer-relative (defined in terms of values held) activities. But his application of this dichotomy to biological processes does not logically hold.

Searle begins his argument with the atomic theory of matter and evolutionary theory of biology. He uses this to argue that mental states are in intrinsic parts of reality because they are physical/chemical processes. Yet, he draws a distinction when he argues that the heart pumping blood (p.15) is simply a causal action, NOT a functional one. He asserts that attributing “function” to this biological phenomenon requires the addition of the value of survival. But survival is not only a value, it is a biological, observable force. For example, tRNA is a series of nucleotides, but it exists with the function of allowing construction of necessary proteins within the cell. The cell ceases to exist (dies) without it. In fact, tRNA mixed with protein building blocks within a cellular-like material will spontaneously begin to build proteins. It is a force of biological life virtually as fundamental as gravity. Blind? Certainly. Function? Definitely.