Musings on Searle
Bea and CCR debate aspects of Searle's The Construction of Social Reality
Collective intentionality:
Searle starts Chapter 1 by using the interaction between a waiter and himself at a French restaurant as an example of the "metaphysical burden" of the invisible ontology of social reality. He follows this example with the observation that the "complex structure of social reality is"weightless and invisible" (5).
It seems that Searle does not necessarily explore the plurality of social realities and the relativity of social facts but moves from the individual mind to the "group mind" (in his discussion of ontological and epistemic objectivity/subjectivity, observer-related phenomenon, and the assignment of agentive and non-agentive functions in Ch. 1 and collective intentionality and creation of institutional facts in Ch. 2).
He follows this example with the observation that the "complex structure of social reality is"weightless and invisible" (5). Is social reality really weightless as Searle purports?
Bea: It seems that Searle's reference point is socially relative. In some cultures, eating on the floor is customary. In others, eating raw fish from a street vendor is customary. In these instances, individuals who move from one social reality (in this case culture) to another feel the metaphysical burden of the socially-constructed ontology in which they operate. In this sense, does Searle meaning the there is an "overarching" social reality, a "majority" social reality (e.g., public nudity is for the most part frowned upon), or several plural social realities?
CCR: I don't necessarily think that Searle is addressing norms or culture when he talks about social reality. These seem to be matters of convention rather than fact (see p.28 for his distinction). Also, Searle talks about Background as a non-conscious premise that people create as they experience the world, and although the stranger in a foreign land may not have this initial Background from which to construct the social reality or social facts in particular social situations, the very fact that there are social facts, like eating on the ground for example, will be noted as a fact and incorporated by the stranger. And I'm sure if the stranger remains for long enough the initially foreign social facts will become parts of that individual's Background knowledge soon enough. My sense of his use of weightless was that these facts, unlike brute facts, are not composed of matter and thus have no physical weight.
Constitutive Facts:
CCR: Is god a constitutive fact of social reality? Does a god exist because its exists is an institutional and social fact for so many of the world's people? If reality is socially constructed based upon various types of facts, then is not its existence a fact?
For example, in Lebanon citizen's are required to have a religion, there is no such thing as an atheist, and from my experience there, such a statement about a belief in no god or higher power is not quite understood. Does this then mean that god is a fact? And if so, are all facts relative?
Relativity of social facts:
Bea: It seems that Searle's reference point is socially relative. In some cultures, eating on the floor is customary. In others, eating raw fish from a street vendor is customary. In these instances, individuals who move from one social reality (in this case culture) to another feel the metaphysical burden of the socially-constructed ontology in which they operate. In this sense, does Searle meaning the there is an "overarching" social reality, a "majority" social reality (e.g., public nudity is for the most part frowned upon), or several plural social realities?
CCR: Also, what happens when a social fact is contested? Do social facts degrade? For example, are social conservatives right when they saw that gay marriage will "destroy the institution of marriage"? If the "fact" of marriage is no longer a "we collective" agreement, and the constitutive rules are no longer uncontested, then does that mean marriage no longer exists as an institutional fact, but rather as a personal perception? If a gay married couple from, say, the Netherlands, where such a manifestation of the institution of marriage is recognized both legally and institutionally/socially, what are the facts of that marriage when they move to, say, Arkansas? If the "collective imposition of function" is contested, what happens to the fact? I would have like to see Searle address not only the creation of social reality, but also the contentious space created by attempts at constituting a contested reality.
Bea: It seems that Searle does not necessarily explore the plurality of social realities and the relativity of social facts but moves from the individual mind to the "group mind" (in his discussion of ontological and epistemic objectivity/subjectivity, observer-related phenomenon, and the assignment of agentive and non-agentive functions in Ch. 1 and collective intentionality and creation of institutional facts in Ch. 2).
- How might social reality be re-constructed when different groups interact? I would argue that Gramscian notion of hegemony would then apply at least in terms of culture which would extend obstensibly to language.
- Does group size matter? If social reality is rooted in the speech act and the speech act is what defines social reality, what implications does this have in a rapidly globalizing world? Is globalization bringing about a uniform social reality?
In chapter 2 Searle discusses the speech act... Is there a difference between a written speech act and a verbal speech act? Can you and should differentiate between the two? And is this relevant to his argument? Do social facts change if they're written versus spoken?
Does group size influence the ability to create institutional facts without writing? what about interconnectivity?
Bea: Searle argues the importance of language in constructing social reality (e.g., "Language is constitutive of institutional reality" p.60). When Searle discusses language, obstensibly he means both written and spoken language. I would argue that he does not sufficiently address the distinction between spoken language and written language. Spoken language assumes a real-time interactive audience and context that adds to the interpretation of the actual words. Written language is typically read singularly and consists of an independent assessment of the words. For example, if I say "I could die tonight", I as the speaker have more control over the meaning I wish to infuse into the statement. It could be joke or a threat depending on how I say it. If I write "I could die tonight" and someone reads it, the reader gains control over how this statement is interpreted. I did not find Searle to adequately address the difference between these two.
CCR: I don't believe the distinction between written and spoken language is relevant to the subject addressed in this book, the construction of social reality. Language itself is an institution, and writing is one aspect of this fact. In our debate yesterday Bea and I discussed whether, for example, a written contract creates a social fact that would not exist without it. Bea distinguished between the writing of a fact and the codification there in, while my perspective was that the concept of a written contract is an institution and only the institutional fact of my having written some marks on a piece of paper within the institution of the law and the regulatory rules that constitute it is relevant to Searle's point. As his example of the wall that although originally composed of rock ends up decaying so it is no longer visible, yet people continue to recognize an implicit border (see P. 39). It doesn't matter whether this border is recognized by the spoken or written word, since any attempt to conretize it only occurs within a system of other institutional facts, and the importance of the written versus the spoken is wrapped up in the social reality that has been constructed, not inherent in the written marks on a page.
Thesis of Book:
Bea: Searle sets forth that one of goals of his book is to prove that there is a reality that "is totally independent of us" (2). He does not actually prove that the real world exists. He concludes that "there is a real world but only that you are committed to its existence when you talk to me or to anyone else about it" (194). Given this conclusion, it seems that Searle uses language as the proof of reality. Therefore, it follows that language (spoken in this instance) is a relational tool requiring at least two people, who then both agree that what they are observing is what it is and, in doing so, create reality. If this is so, it seems to follow that Searle contradicts himself in that an independent reality exists when described through a socially constructed tool (language). So, does the tree that falls in the forest really fall if no one heard it?
CCR: And can you prove a fact through negation?
Hegemony and power
What role do the more powerful play in the construction of social reality? Searle never adequately addresses this point. It seems to me that a hegemon (relatively far more powerful), such as the United States or a feudal lord would have greater abilities to constitute new institutional facts since they can create regulatory rules and impose functionality that must be recognized by others. I'm thinking, for example, if the US says there is a war on terror, then there is because they can create and then interpret brute facts, which then become fodder for social facts like the WOT. If Burkina Faso did exactly the same thing I highly doubt the world would now be subject to a WOT.
If the more powerful indeed do have greater control and influence over the construction of social reality, what implications does this have for the have-nots? Does revolution depend on the deconstruction of social facts and constitutive rules?
Collective intentionality:
Searle starts Chapter 1 by using the interaction between a waiter and himself at a French restaurant as an example of the "metaphysical burden" of the invisible ontology of social reality. He follows this example with the observation that the "complex structure of social reality is"weightless and invisible" (5).
It seems that Searle does not necessarily explore the plurality of social realities and the relativity of social facts but moves from the individual mind to the "group mind" (in his discussion of ontological and epistemic objectivity/subjectivity, observer-related phenomenon, and the assignment of agentive and non-agentive functions in Ch. 1 and collective intentionality and creation of institutional facts in Ch. 2).
He follows this example with the observation that the "complex structure of social reality is"weightless and invisible" (5). Is social reality really weightless as Searle purports?
Bea: It seems that Searle's reference point is socially relative. In some cultures, eating on the floor is customary. In others, eating raw fish from a street vendor is customary. In these instances, individuals who move from one social reality (in this case culture) to another feel the metaphysical burden of the socially-constructed ontology in which they operate. In this sense, does Searle meaning the there is an "overarching" social reality, a "majority" social reality (e.g., public nudity is for the most part frowned upon), or several plural social realities?
CCR: I don't necessarily think that Searle is addressing norms or culture when he talks about social reality. These seem to be matters of convention rather than fact (see p.28 for his distinction). Also, Searle talks about Background as a non-conscious premise that people create as they experience the world, and although the stranger in a foreign land may not have this initial Background from which to construct the social reality or social facts in particular social situations, the very fact that there are social facts, like eating on the ground for example, will be noted as a fact and incorporated by the stranger. And I'm sure if the stranger remains for long enough the initially foreign social facts will become parts of that individual's Background knowledge soon enough. My sense of his use of weightless was that these facts, unlike brute facts, are not composed of matter and thus have no physical weight.
Constitutive Facts:
CCR: Is god a constitutive fact of social reality? Does a god exist because its exists is an institutional and social fact for so many of the world's people? If reality is socially constructed based upon various types of facts, then is not its existence a fact?
For example, in Lebanon citizen's are required to have a religion, there is no such thing as an atheist, and from my experience there, such a statement about a belief in no god or higher power is not quite understood. Does this then mean that god is a fact? And if so, are all facts relative?
Relativity of social facts:
Bea: It seems that Searle's reference point is socially relative. In some cultures, eating on the floor is customary. In others, eating raw fish from a street vendor is customary. In these instances, individuals who move from one social reality (in this case culture) to another feel the metaphysical burden of the socially-constructed ontology in which they operate. In this sense, does Searle meaning the there is an "overarching" social reality, a "majority" social reality (e.g., public nudity is for the most part frowned upon), or several plural social realities?
CCR: Also, what happens when a social fact is contested? Do social facts degrade? For example, are social conservatives right when they saw that gay marriage will "destroy the institution of marriage"? If the "fact" of marriage is no longer a "we collective" agreement, and the constitutive rules are no longer uncontested, then does that mean marriage no longer exists as an institutional fact, but rather as a personal perception? If a gay married couple from, say, the Netherlands, where such a manifestation of the institution of marriage is recognized both legally and institutionally/socially, what are the facts of that marriage when they move to, say, Arkansas? If the "collective imposition of function" is contested, what happens to the fact? I would have like to see Searle address not only the creation of social reality, but also the contentious space created by attempts at constituting a contested reality.
Bea: It seems that Searle does not necessarily explore the plurality of social realities and the relativity of social facts but moves from the individual mind to the "group mind" (in his discussion of ontological and epistemic objectivity/subjectivity, observer-related phenomenon, and the assignment of agentive and non-agentive functions in Ch. 1 and collective intentionality and creation of institutional facts in Ch. 2).
- How might social reality be re-constructed when different groups interact? I would argue that Gramscian notion of hegemony would then apply at least in terms of culture which would extend obstensibly to language.
- Does group size matter? If social reality is rooted in the speech act and the speech act is what defines social reality, what implications does this have in a rapidly globalizing world? Is globalization bringing about a uniform social reality?
In chapter 2 Searle discusses the speech act... Is there a difference between a written speech act and a verbal speech act? Can you and should differentiate between the two? And is this relevant to his argument? Do social facts change if they're written versus spoken?
Does group size influence the ability to create institutional facts without writing? what about interconnectivity?
Bea: Searle argues the importance of language in constructing social reality (e.g., "Language is constitutive of institutional reality" p.60). When Searle discusses language, obstensibly he means both written and spoken language. I would argue that he does not sufficiently address the distinction between spoken language and written language. Spoken language assumes a real-time interactive audience and context that adds to the interpretation of the actual words. Written language is typically read singularly and consists of an independent assessment of the words. For example, if I say "I could die tonight", I as the speaker have more control over the meaning I wish to infuse into the statement. It could be joke or a threat depending on how I say it. If I write "I could die tonight" and someone reads it, the reader gains control over how this statement is interpreted. I did not find Searle to adequately address the difference between these two.
CCR: I don't believe the distinction between written and spoken language is relevant to the subject addressed in this book, the construction of social reality. Language itself is an institution, and writing is one aspect of this fact. In our debate yesterday Bea and I discussed whether, for example, a written contract creates a social fact that would not exist without it. Bea distinguished between the writing of a fact and the codification there in, while my perspective was that the concept of a written contract is an institution and only the institutional fact of my having written some marks on a piece of paper within the institution of the law and the regulatory rules that constitute it is relevant to Searle's point. As his example of the wall that although originally composed of rock ends up decaying so it is no longer visible, yet people continue to recognize an implicit border (see P. 39). It doesn't matter whether this border is recognized by the spoken or written word, since any attempt to conretize it only occurs within a system of other institutional facts, and the importance of the written versus the spoken is wrapped up in the social reality that has been constructed, not inherent in the written marks on a page.
Thesis of Book:
Bea: Searle sets forth that one of goals of his book is to prove that there is a reality that "is totally independent of us" (2). He does not actually prove that the real world exists. He concludes that "there is a real world but only that you are committed to its existence when you talk to me or to anyone else about it" (194). Given this conclusion, it seems that Searle uses language as the proof of reality. Therefore, it follows that language (spoken in this instance) is a relational tool requiring at least two people, who then both agree that what they are observing is what it is and, in doing so, create reality. If this is so, it seems to follow that Searle contradicts himself in that an independent reality exists when described through a socially constructed tool (language). So, does the tree that falls in the forest really fall if no one heard it?
CCR: And can you prove a fact through negation?
Hegemony and power
What role do the more powerful play in the construction of social reality? Searle never adequately addresses this point. It seems to me that a hegemon (relatively far more powerful), such as the United States or a feudal lord would have greater abilities to constitute new institutional facts since they can create regulatory rules and impose functionality that must be recognized by others. I'm thinking, for example, if the US says there is a war on terror, then there is because they can create and then interpret brute facts, which then become fodder for social facts like the WOT. If Burkina Faso did exactly the same thing I highly doubt the world would now be subject to a WOT.
If the more powerful indeed do have greater control and influence over the construction of social reality, what implications does this have for the have-nots? Does revolution depend on the deconstruction of social facts and constitutive rules?
posted by C at 4:32 PM
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