The norms argument in a nutshell [edited]
[After posting this it occurred to me that a clarification of Searle's terminology regarding objective and subjective would help to clarify the argument, so I have updated the post accordingly by inserting point 0 and its associated sub-points, and modified the rest of the post to reflect that tweaked terminology.]
To flesh out a bit my comment near the end of class today:
0) Searle's distinctions between ontologically and epistemically "objective" and "subjective" are, I think, somewhat misleading, inasmuch as the meaning of the terms shifts subtly between the ontological and epistemic registers. So let me propose the following amendments by way of clarification:
a) ontologically speaking, what Searle means by "objective" and "subjective" is whether the object or state of affairs in question exists independent of human social action, or is dependent on human social action. (To use Ian Hacking's helpful terminology here for a second, the distinction is between indifferent kinds -- indifferent to how they are labelled or discussed -- and interactive kinds, kinds of things where how they are labelled matters. Asteroids and stars are indifferent kinds, since it doesn't matter to them how we classify them; refugees and civilians and state officials are interactive kinds, because all the important work is done in the labeling.)
b) epistemically speaking, what Searle means by "objective" and "subjective" is whether the truth of the statement in question can be ascertained impersonally, or whether the truth-value of the statement depends on the personal characteristics of the speaker and/or listener. Personal statements have a lot of room for individual variation, and are ultimately expressions of individual whim or taste or discretion; impersonal statements have truth-conditions that are something other than pure functions of the individual involved, and so at the very least members of a community can reason their way to a compelling consensus about them.
c) these distinctions can be combined, but the combinations have different implications. When we are talking about ontologically independent objects and states of affairs (indifferent kinds), personal statements are most likely opinions about something while impersonal statements are some kind of best approximation to the brute facts involved -- with "best" in this circumstance being relative to local cultural and historical conditions, and potentially able to be superseded in the future. But when we are talking abut ontologically dependent objects and states of affairs -- interactive kinds -- personal statements might still be opinions, but impersonal statements cannot be approximations to brute facts because there aren't any brute facts involved at the appropriate level of abstraction. The statement "this person is a refugee" can't simply mirror an ontologically independent state of affairs because 1) being a refugee is like being a screwdriver in that both are assigned statuses dependent on intentional social action, and 2) under certain circumstances the statement might be performative, actually making the person in question a refugee. So the most we get with impersonal statements about ontologically dependent objects and state of affairs is community consensus, not approximation to a mind-independent external reality.
1) in Searle's lexicon, norms are social facts, hence ontologically dependent. (Note that patterns of behavior might not be ontologically dependent in Searle's sense, but a norm -- which carries with it some sense of appropriate expectations -- cannot be thought of as the kind of thing that would exist in the absence of human beings.)
2) thus, claiming the existence of a norm is an observer-relative operation. Even though we might be able to make epistemically impersonal statements about the existence of a norm, such statements would necessarily depend on our prior commitment to a particular account of norms and normativity in general and the shape of this norm in particular. There is no ontologically independent character to a social fact (or, perhaps, the ontologically independent brute fact on which the social fact supervenes is so far down the chain that the social fact simply can't be derived from it), so all we have is a collective intentionality in which we as social observers participate just as the other participants do.
3) and hence, we cannot study norms the way that we might study ontologically independent, mind-independent features of the world. Instead, we necessarily participate in the process by which norms are formed and reformed even as we study those norms. Unlike with our espresso example from in class, there is no relevant and identifiable brute-factual core to claims about norms -- which doesn't make norms any less real than, say, money, but it does make claims about norms something quite different than claims about, say, the chemical composition of the coffee bean.
4) all of this is true of any social and institutional fact -- which covers most of what we as social scientists are interested in.
All five of these points are contestable; I toss them out as a basis for subsequent discussion and conversation.
To flesh out a bit my comment near the end of class today:
0) Searle's distinctions between ontologically and epistemically "objective" and "subjective" are, I think, somewhat misleading, inasmuch as the meaning of the terms shifts subtly between the ontological and epistemic registers. So let me propose the following amendments by way of clarification:
a) ontologically speaking, what Searle means by "objective" and "subjective" is whether the object or state of affairs in question exists independent of human social action, or is dependent on human social action. (To use Ian Hacking's helpful terminology here for a second, the distinction is between indifferent kinds -- indifferent to how they are labelled or discussed -- and interactive kinds, kinds of things where how they are labelled matters. Asteroids and stars are indifferent kinds, since it doesn't matter to them how we classify them; refugees and civilians and state officials are interactive kinds, because all the important work is done in the labeling.)
b) epistemically speaking, what Searle means by "objective" and "subjective" is whether the truth of the statement in question can be ascertained impersonally, or whether the truth-value of the statement depends on the personal characteristics of the speaker and/or listener. Personal statements have a lot of room for individual variation, and are ultimately expressions of individual whim or taste or discretion; impersonal statements have truth-conditions that are something other than pure functions of the individual involved, and so at the very least members of a community can reason their way to a compelling consensus about them.
c) these distinctions can be combined, but the combinations have different implications. When we are talking about ontologically independent objects and states of affairs (indifferent kinds), personal statements are most likely opinions about something while impersonal statements are some kind of best approximation to the brute facts involved -- with "best" in this circumstance being relative to local cultural and historical conditions, and potentially able to be superseded in the future. But when we are talking abut ontologically dependent objects and states of affairs -- interactive kinds -- personal statements might still be opinions, but impersonal statements cannot be approximations to brute facts because there aren't any brute facts involved at the appropriate level of abstraction. The statement "this person is a refugee" can't simply mirror an ontologically independent state of affairs because 1) being a refugee is like being a screwdriver in that both are assigned statuses dependent on intentional social action, and 2) under certain circumstances the statement might be performative, actually making the person in question a refugee. So the most we get with impersonal statements about ontologically dependent objects and state of affairs is community consensus, not approximation to a mind-independent external reality.
1) in Searle's lexicon, norms are social facts, hence ontologically dependent. (Note that patterns of behavior might not be ontologically dependent in Searle's sense, but a norm -- which carries with it some sense of appropriate expectations -- cannot be thought of as the kind of thing that would exist in the absence of human beings.)
2) thus, claiming the existence of a norm is an observer-relative operation. Even though we might be able to make epistemically impersonal statements about the existence of a norm, such statements would necessarily depend on our prior commitment to a particular account of norms and normativity in general and the shape of this norm in particular. There is no ontologically independent character to a social fact (or, perhaps, the ontologically independent brute fact on which the social fact supervenes is so far down the chain that the social fact simply can't be derived from it), so all we have is a collective intentionality in which we as social observers participate just as the other participants do.
3) and hence, we cannot study norms the way that we might study ontologically independent, mind-independent features of the world. Instead, we necessarily participate in the process by which norms are formed and reformed even as we study those norms. Unlike with our espresso example from in class, there is no relevant and identifiable brute-factual core to claims about norms -- which doesn't make norms any less real than, say, money, but it does make claims about norms something quite different than claims about, say, the chemical composition of the coffee bean.
4) all of this is true of any social and institutional fact -- which covers most of what we as social scientists are interested in.
All five of these points are contestable; I toss them out as a basis for subsequent discussion and conversation.
posted by ProfPTJ at 7:01 PM
2 Comments:
These are not really the points I came up with after reading the book. My impression was that Searle tried to connect every social fact to a brute fact, therefore to reject any claims arguing for a 'from-the-scratch construction of social reality'. Yet, I have to admit Dr. Jackson's comments make the book 'more meaningful'.
However, one question remains in my mind. Yes, there are ontologically dependent facts in the nature, but social facts are ontologically independent. Therefore, they should be studied differently. - Doesn't this claim -at least in terms of research 'methods- make the formula X counts as Y in context C obsolete and irrelevant?
As long as I'm aware that social norms are ontologically dependent, and know about the social processes for creating such norms; I cannot understand the impacts of correspondence on my research.
I agree with Efe. By this, I mean that I consider all social science research to be about social facts, and I am comfortable with that. To me, brute facts as defined by Searle - the molecular and physical existence of substances - is just not that interesting. What is interesting is what people do with brute facts, i.e. the meaning they give to the material world.
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