Wednesday, April 27, 2005

Conversational Realities

Does reducing everything to conversation make any more sense than reducing everything to material objects?

This question bothered me throughout my reading of Conversational Realities, but especially in Shotter's discussion of the mind. I concede that human beings from different social and historical backgrounds have different ways of understanding the mind, and that all may be mythical. However, I don't accept Shotter's argument that mental process is linguistic. In the very beginning (pg. 2), Shotter writes, "In other words, instead of understanding our thoughts and ideas being presented to us as if visually, like we see bounded, material objects, in an instant, we are coming to talk of them as having more the quality of an extended sequence of commands or instructions as to how to act.... [I]t is as if such commands or instructions are presented to us dialogically or conversationally by the voice of an other, one who responds to each phase of our action by indicating to us a next feature to which we should attend... [I]nstead of in visual and ocular metaphors, we are coming to make sense of our talk in terms of metaphors drawn from the realm of talk itself." Reflecting on my own thoughts and ideas, I would agree that many have a dialogical quality to them, particularly with regard to certain types of processes--decision-making, in particular. Other thoughts and ideas are presented to me visually, or through other senses. A startle response to a large sound is, to me, auditory but not linguistic. Of course, I could transform an auditory or visual or olfactory thought into a mental conversation, if so inclined--but does that make all of my thoughts dialogic or conversational?

Shotter's assertion that there are no "extralinguistic entities whose significance is linguistically clear prior to talk 'about' them; there are no extralinguistic 'somethings' in the world merely awaiting precise or accurate description" (pg. 182) strikes me as both obvious and clearly outrageous, making me wonder if his scare-quoted prepositions are working overtime--prepositions have always been slippery for me anyway, so perhaps I'm just misunderstanding. On the one hand, he seems to have constructed a tautology: What does the linguistic clarity of X mean if X hasn't been talked about? How can an "extralinguistic entity" X be "linguistically clear" regardless of the talk of/about X? And then, in the second half of the sentence, Shotter seems to be arguing that there is nothing extralinguistic in the world at all. To me, there is quite a lot in the world that is extralinguistic.

Aspects of the book reminded me of our discussion on Monday about the difference between relativism and pluralism with regard to theories and disciplinary debates. I appreciated his call for a "tradition of argumentation" as a "continuous, noneliminative, inclusionary, multi-voiced conversation" (pg. 9). Such a tradition would seem to address our hopes for pluralism, without succumbing to relativism. How can we produce or construct this pluralistic civil society?

I'll end there for now, to get things started. Please accept my apologies for the late posting--I'm still recovering from the wild ride of a week we've all had plus the remains of this evil infection.

Wednesday, April 20, 2005

A Fractal-work Orange? The Bride of Fractalstein?

Anxiety. Mind. Body. Fatigue. Hygiene. Nervous System. Nervous Disease. Mental Disorder.
(Chart, p. 40)

My sentiments exactly.

p. 219, Footnote # 25: Abbott dreams of a theory that will allow him to continually surf atop the great fractal wave, always a step ahead of the perpetual crest and crash of paradigms, always a cut above the endless recycling of the nagging moral claims of various subaltern groups and theories. I can't fault him for that. He knows that Sisyphus will never get the rock up the hill, so he studies all the different unsuccessful strategies that Sisyphus could employ. The only thing that surprises me is that Abbott was surprised that this commenter accused him of conducting an exercise in hegemonic universalism. Having mapped the inexorable dynamic of academic argument, I would have assumed he'd had that accusation thrown his way before. Well, as we now know, he will inevitably encounter it again and again.

It's a theory that explains the dynamics of intellectual inquiry so well, it could put you to sleep.

If that sounds cryptic at all, it means I find his theory accurate but uninspiring--very "scientific," in the purely pejorative sense that implies a rigidity that doesn't allow for humor or horror.

Speaking of horror, I'm about to quote Nietzsche, something I never anticipated wanting or knowing how to do. Please don't tell anyone.

"What does the people really understand by knowledge?...Nothing more than this: Something strange shall be traced back to something familiar... The familiar is to say: that to which we are accustomed, so tha we are no longer surprised at it... Is our need to know not precisely this--the need for the familiar, the will to discover among all that is strange, unaccustomed, questionable something that no longer disturbs us?"

Self-similar systems.

It seems he's undertaking to rehabilitate Durkheim by operationalizing Taoism for contemporary academic debate (i.e. paradoxical holism, the Yin and Yang thing). I prefer the original. And Wittgenstein's update.

"When the whole is divided,the parts need new names."

The fractal evolution of Taoism is that is fantastic for achieving resolution and reconciliation, but it points in the direction of complacency. Like every theory, it gets over-determinate when indiscriminately applied.

I just wish he'd explained a world that had any "chaos" to it--he seems to have made clockwork sense out of everything.

There you are, Dylan. No more special snowflakes.

I have no questions.

Ned

(Don't get me wrong, it's nothing personal against Abbott; First of all, my discontent is probably primarily due to a fractally expanding case of stress, fatigue and resultant ill-being--and that's a direct causal link; Second, he earned points with me for the following reasons:

1) My undergrad major was also an amalgam of history and lit;
2) I also do not wish to identify passionately with a methodology because I imagine they're all useful or not depending on the context and the skill/preference of the researcher;
3) I also hate the fact that extreme arguments can repeatedly win by virtue of their consistency with no relation to truth or moral content--just like fundamentalist movements are the best equipped over the long term to manipulate democracies;
4) Even though I know it's a terrible shame to be one, I probably am some species of liberal;
5) He mentioned my neighborhood in DC (footnote, p. 197).)

Wednesday, April 13, 2005

Kondo and Anthro

Two notes:
First, it's great to see Simon on the blog.
Second, it's not my "official" turn to be the first blogger for this week, but I'm posting my rambling thoughts anyway:

Kondo’s work seems to directly come off of Foucault. With the constant emphasis on context, discourse, and power, she presents what she calls the relation between economics and the family. The book is rich in “thick description” throughout, and the early part read like a captivating novel to me. I think the book represents a commendable effort in anthropology and shows the connection between understanding and explaining. But something I’m still struggling with or am not entirely clear on is how such a position is achieved. As she so often admits, the researcher’s own personality, background, and “culture” enter into the research, so that what emerges is the product of the researcher and the researched, with neither entity being entirely separate from the other and both being constantly constructed through their interaction with each other. I very much appreciate this effort, and the constant emphasis on the interconnection between theory and practice, and but am unclear about what really makes it a social scientific inquiry and how one is to achieve it. In other words, what is it about this approach that makes it different from a purely subjective enterprise i.e. what makes it social science? From reading it, it feels like a well-researched project, but it's difficult to put your finger on exactly what makes it a science.

Tuesday, April 12, 2005


On a felucca in Cairo Posted by Hello

Monday, April 04, 2005

Foucault, Sex, History and such

This week I will ask a series of questions to prompt discussion. But, since Foucault spoke far more poetically and provacatively than I, I will also offer a few quotations that may prompt a response.

1) What is Foucault's relation to epistemology? In other words, does he work from the position that his words correspond or refer to things? Or, perhaps, does he work from the position that his words do not correspond to things but to facts? Things.....facts....what is the difference? The point is: how do words get their meanings?

2) What role does truth play in Foucault's analysis? Is he discovering truths (timeless or otherwise) about the world?

3) Is Foucault practicing applied metaphysics?

4) What is the relationship between the "material" world and the "ideational" world in Foucault's analysis?

5) What is the "will to knowledge" that Foucault speaks of?

6) What role does contingency and subjugated knowledges play in genealogical analysis?

7) What is the difference between a theory of power and an analytics of power?

8) Power?

Now for some quotable quotes that might prompt you to take the discussion in whatever direction:

In "Genealogy" Foucault wrote: "This is because knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting."

"Examining the history of reason, he [the genealogist] learns that it was born in an altogether 'reasonable' fashion--from chance; devotion to truth and the precision of scientific methods arose from the passion of scholars, their reciprocal hatred, their fanatical and unending discussions, and their spirit of com-petition--the personal conflicts that slowly forged the weapons of reason."

"Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thu8s proceeds from domination to domination."

In History Foucault wrote: "In political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king."

"Rule of immanence. One must not suppose that there exists a certain sphere of sexuality that would be the legitimate concern of a free and disinterested scientific inquiry were it not the object of mechanisms of prohibition brought to bear by the economic or ideological requirements of power."

"discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hinderance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it."

Foucault, Sex, History and such

This week I will ask a series of questions to prompt discussion. But, since Foucault spoke far more poetically and provacatively than I, I will also offer a few quotations that may prompt a response.

1) What is Foucault's relation to epistemology? In other words, does he work from the position that his words correspond or refer to things? Or, perhaps, does he work from the position that his words do not correspond to things but to facts? Things.....facts....what is the difference? The point is: how do words get their meanings?

2) What role does truth play in Foucault's analysis? Is he discovering truths (timeless or otherwise) about the world?

3) Is Foucault practicing applied metaphysics?

4) What is the relationship between the "material" world and the "ideational" world in Foucault's analysis?

5) What is the "will to knowledge" that Foucault speaks of?

6) What role does contingency and subjugated knowledges play in genealogical analysis?

7) What is the difference between a theory of power and an analytics of power?

8) Power?

Now for some quotable quotes that might prompt you to take the discussion in whatever direction:

In "Genealogy" Foucault wrote: "This is because knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting."

"Examining the history of reason, he [the genealogist] learns that it was born in an altogether 'reasonable' fashion--from chance; devotion to truth and the precision of scientific methods arose from the passion of scholars, their reciprocal hatred, their fanatical and unending discussions, and their spirit of com-petition--the personal conflicts that slowly forged the weapons of reason."

"Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thu8s proceeds from domination to domination."

In History Foucault wrote: "In political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king."

"Rule of immanence. One must not suppose that there exists a certain sphere of sexuality that would be the legitimate concern of a free and disinterested scientific inquiry were it not the object of mechanisms of prohibition brought to bear by the economic or ideological requirements of power."

"discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hinderance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it."