Taking SWAGS in the Chinese Copy Room, I-Robot, and other space junk

Orr’s interaction of man and machine demonstrate Searle’s Chinese room in action. Technicians, like the computer, have a list of procedures to abide by for given error codes, or inputs. But as technicians evolve with experience, they are able to improvise. Understanding and adapting to the context of the problem (customer is using cheaper toner is being used to due to a scam or maintaining the peace in an ongoing battle with the other half of the building over mooching off supplies) is an essential component of being a successful technician. Even use of directive documentation (106) in conveying information to the technicians which would seem to treat the technicians as automatons is still insufficient in fixing the copiers as evidenced by technicians’ taking SWAGs, which would simply be impossible for machines. Will Artificial Intelligence ever surpass the human ingenuity which created it?

The question we should be concerned with is less that we will have Will Smith running around trying to shut down the master brain in I-Robot due to a lethal faulty logic stream, but rather, the extent to which humans depend on artificial intelligence and change their behavior according to it. Could one argue that the Asian Financial Crisis is the result of machines capable of transferring billions of dollars, enabling capital flight at the press of button and therefore causing financial shock waves through Southeast Asia, Russia, Mexico and the United States? Clearly, globalization and along with, what some would argue, an increased standard of living, would not be possible without machines.

Along the lines of increasing globalization, modernization theory, and subsequently, development theory holds that progress is linear and that industrialization is an essential component of becoming a “modern” or “developed” state. As a result, economists would argue that developing countries need to increasingly specialize their industrial output and move away from commodities towards manufactures in order to become “developed”. However, Orr argues that increased specialization removes the individual from the work and work becomes an increasing abstraction. So, what do we lose, if anything, in becoming “modern”?

Ethnography as a Research Method

Orr stated that there are “three characteristics of ethnographic description”: interpretation, interpretation from social discourse and preservation of the discourse. Ethnographic research is then the observation of how socially reality is constructed. A benefit to this approach is thick description, as evidenced by Orr’s recounting of conversations and the intimacy with which the team members share with the research. Often, Orr’s subjects are conversing with him and even when they are not, the act of being observed is a new factor injected into the reality of the way the technicians and customer act. As a result, observations are biased. How does this bias affect the outcome of what is observed? Does observation without the awareness of those being observed mean a less biased observation? How does this bias compare to the bias of running regressions to observe correlations, for example? Is one better than the other?

Assigning Function - How to Deal with Biology?

Searle argues that the “assignment of function” (13-23) is one of the elements necessary to understanding the ontology of socially created reality. He argues at great length that there is a key distinction between intrinsic (independent of any mental state) and observer-relative (defined in terms of values held) activities. But his application of this dichotomy to biological processes does not logically hold.

Searle begins his argument with the atomic theory of matter and evolutionary theory of biology. He uses this to argue that mental states are in intrinsic parts of reality because they are physical/chemical processes. Yet, he draws a distinction when he argues that the heart pumping blood (p.15) is simply a causal action, NOT a functional one. He asserts that attributing “function” to this biological phenomenon requires the addition of the value of survival. But survival is not only a value, it is a biological, observable force. For example, tRNA is a series of nucleotides, but it exists with the function of allowing construction of necessary proteins within the cell. The cell ceases to exist (dies) without it. In fact, tRNA mixed with protein building blocks within a cellular-like material will spontaneously begin to build proteins. It is a force of biological life virtually as fundamental as gravity. Blind? Certainly. Function? Definitely.

Hegemony, Language, and Social Reality

Thanks to CCR and Bea for starting us off with their engaging discussion. To address a few of your points, Bea, I noticed that you in particular raised the notion of cultural relativism and hegemony in regards to Searle’s notion of social reality, which I thought was interesting. You’re right that Searle doesn’t really address either of these issues… yet, while they are interesting topics to disucss, I don’t feel that they are necessary for Searle’s thesis. For example, you ask “does Searle mean that there is an "overarching" social reality, a "majority" social reality (e.g., public nudity is for the most part frowned upon), or several plural social realities?” From my reading of Searle, I understood that he does believe in an external reality that exists independently of our representations of it. Yet, it is only natural that our representations of it vary (ie, by culture), thus social realities and institutions are diverse and pluralistic, even though there is a more overarching external reality.

A brief diversion to reply to CCR's question into the permanence or nonpermanence of external reality… I agree that even brute facts can change, since physical “facts” are not always constant. For example, what is at one moment ice can at the next moment be water. Yet, it is still H2O. So, while the facts within an external reality can change, even brute facts, and in the longue duree even the components of the external reality can change (such as mountains eroding), the notion of the external reality remains constant. That is, while the epistemic facts may change, the ontology of an external reality stays the same. I think the best answer to your question is on page 155 when Searle states that external realism “does not say how things are but only that there is a way that they are.”

Getting back to Bea’s original thoughts on cultural relativism and hegemony… I agree that more powerful individuals/states/schools of thought may play a part in the creation of certain institutions and institutional facts… but I believe that social reality can be localized enough for different peoples and cultures to create their own institutions and institutional facts by which they live. In other words, individuals have some agency in creating their own social reality by deciding what they do or do not subscribe to. Some things are of course easier to think consciously about than others… for example, it is easier to conclude that one does not believe in marriage and live one’s life without being married than it is to say, not believe in language or even money. But, because social reality requires collective intentionality, I think that it avoids being subsumed by hegemony.

You raise an interesting point about language as well, and its connection to hegemony. But again, I think it is the notion or ontology of language as a structure of symbols that matters most to Searle, not the specifics of one language being dominant over another. The same is true for written and spoken language… the mode of the communication of words does not matter so much to Searle as the fact that there exists a system of symbols that can transform the X to the Y. I agree with you however Bea, that a more nuanced discussion by Searle addressing spoken v. written language would have been both helpful and interesting.

Thanks!

Construction of Reality, Construction of Power

Searle's work on the construction of social reality to incorporate, elucidate and reaffirm human experience and essentially validate human reality resonates with the human need to put the self in in the epicenter of existence. That, I would argue, is my entry point into the discussion. I think both Courtney and Bea did a fantastic job in highlighting the key issues of Searle's work and I appreciate the critiques both provided in the understanding of the relevance of his writing in the construction of not only social realities, but stretched beyond it, to the construction of social identities, selves, others, and in essence providing meanings to all that is essential for human existence and legitimacy of human existence.

I strongly agree with Bea in her analysis of where Searle leaves the readers with more questions than answers. In discussing social realities, the assumption he certainly works with that of social relativity and more so cultural relativity. He does not make a distinction between the use of language as a verbal or written form, and I would stretch this discussion further and add a third category of language that goes beyond both the oral and the written manifestation. The language of the body, the eyes, and in fact the entire world of communication is based on different layers of social realities and beyond it, there is also an element of metaphysical reality, especially when one considers communication to transcend human relationships and extend it to perhaps how individuals tend to relate to the greater universe outside of their immediate worlds. Hence, my interest in Searle's work lies in the assumptions and the limited discussion he highlights on the issues of the metaphysical and that of power.

If social realities are constructed to provide ourselves with a greater meaning and legitimacy for existence, then what can be said about the power we confer to an understanding of a form or an idea greater than ourselves which humbles our very existence? is that kind of understanding of power outside of the construction of social reality? or as Bea pointed out, are there different levels of social realities and we can at best work with the ones that are the most tangible and lends itself most to manipulation for our own adaptation and for maintaining our unique position in the chain of existence? is the conferring of power to a greater Being, or the construction of the social reality of identity groups based on a common spiritual understanding self-defeating in the desire for creating social realities that intend to consolidate power? how would Searle address this conflict of interest where the construction of social realities aims to legitimize the centrality of the human experience, yet in some cases humbles human existence and recreates a very different form of power relationship that cannot be contained or understood within the tangible paradigm within which humans operate?

Bea's point on different levels of social realities also triggered a different line of thinking with regard to power and construction of social realities. Searle was concerned with the existence of realities that are outside and independent of human existence just as much as those that exist and reaffirm legitimacy of the human experience. I would argue that even within these two parallel realities, there is a power relationship and a hierarchy in terms of importance because social realities are, at best relational. There is little importance and relevance to the existence of realities independent of the human experience; realities become realities, whether, social, physical, psychological or emotional, when they engage in highlighting or undermining power relationships between men and women and between societies. To provide an example. the ‘discovery’ that the earth is not the center of the universe was in itself an independent reality devoid of human intervention or existence. Yet the implications of the discovery was more important in the reconstruction of the relationship between man and the church rather than the man and his understanding of the actual universe. It is this link between reality and the conceptualization of the reality and the implication of it in terms of man’s relationship to man, society to society, civilizations to civilizations that becomes more important in designing every aspect of reality and the construction of power than the mere existence of reality itself.

The Matrix Revisited

In the progressively lousy trilogy about “The Matrix,” (most certainly familiar to any geek who would read this) Neo was unplugged and left the Matrix consisting of zeroes and ones. Instead he enters the “real” world. But in a “God’s eye perspective,” are the liquid-filled pods containing the humans plugged in to the Matrix any more real than the reality provided inside the Matrix? The zeroes and ones make up objects treated as bathtubs, screwdrivers, or any other object – epistemically/ontologically subjective or objective – that Searle can think up. The difference between the two worlds, however, lies partly in a point made by Searle himself in his “defense” of Realism. That is, things outside of the Matrix exist regardless of what humans label them.

The proclamation that nothing has meaning without our interpretation is a monument to human arrogance. Revelation: the physical world doesn’t give a damn of what humans interpret into it; the earth was revolving around the sun long before humans discovered this. Or maybe it doesn’t. Maybe we’re wrong about that too. But the point is that it doesn’t matter; things are the way they are, regardless of if we know it or not. Now, for us (insignificant) humans, the construction of the social reality can clearly have consequences. The process of reaching consensus on the labeling of social facts can indeed be as contentious for us humans as it was for the Smurfs (is it a “cork-smurf,” or a “smurf-screw”?). It seems to me that Searle’s point is that the world does indeed consist of objective facts, albeit parallel and forever connected to a social invisible world. Socially constructed facts cannot exist without brute facts, brute facts can, however, exist just fine without socially constructed facts. Again, we humans are utterly insignificant.

In Sweden we have a saying: “All cats are grey in the dark.” I’m not sure what it means, we are a mysterious people and rarely understand each other when we speak. But let’s forget about the deeper meaning, and assume that it simply refers to the nightly lack of enough light particles to create what our humanoid eyes perceive as “color.” Thus, I may see a cat during the day and notice that it is beige, but a few hours later see the same cat and notice it is grey. These are two equally real observations (my eye is convinced it is providing my brain with the correct information), but possibly with very different repercussions. Well, at least there would be if I was a cat-racist, and felt the need to kill all the grey cats in the world; it would then be a matter of life or death for any cat coming my way.

The slightly worn-out example of a tree falling in a forest void of any living creature with ears (does it make a sound?), is easily refuted by any physicist since the argument is, of course, that the laws of physics tell us that sound waves are created regardless of the presence of ears. We know this, supposedly, because every time a tree has fallen and people have been around to hear it, it has created sound waves. Thus, the scientist with his love for inference will conclude that a tree always makes a sound when it falls. The color of the cat, in contrast, is not only dependent on the presence of eyes to see it, but also on the light particles to provide its allergy-inducing fur with a specific color. So does a cat in the dark have any color but grey?

Yes, of course it does. The particles of light only convey an image to be perceived by the seeing eye; they do not create anything. So, in the terms of Searle, that the cat has a color is a “brute fact,” that we perceive it as beige or grey is a “socially constructed fact” that we all agree on and therefore treat as reality. The defense of Realism does not lie in the fact that we all as humans agree on the “socially constructed facts,” and thereby act towards objects as if they are real. In other words, the fact that “God” has been treated as a “real” entity by millions of people does not make him a brute fact.

As for a “mountain” turning out to be a “valley,” the physical world does not care about those labels. In Searle’s terms, a “mountain” is epistemically objective, but ontologically subjective. The mountain itself really cannot be bothered with considering whether it is perceived as a mountain or not (the Beqaa valley in Lebanon, for instance, is not a valley at all, but a plateau between to mountain ridges, is it offended that humans label it a “valley”?).

Nor does the defense of Realism lie in the inevitable acceptance of Realist assumptions in attempts to refute Realism. Instead, it lies in the basic physics of things; there is a “real” world because of observable physics. This world does not change (eroded mountains do not in effect disappear, only their ontologically subjective meaning changes; their fundamental building blocks remain in some form or another), although the human understanding of it may. The socially constructed world, however, is malleable and changes fundamentally over time. This is why the physical world will always be the “real” world; were it any other way Neo should have left the dreary physical world he was brought into, and plugged himself back in to the much more pleasant world created by the Matrix, since it would then be equally real to the physical world. And that, well, that’s just crazy talk!

"Deep thoughts" on brute facts

So I'm sitting here reading about the conquest of Islam in the first millennium and I got to wondering about the objective reality or existence of brute facts. Searle supports his claim of realism by attempting to prove the existence of brute facts, uncontested and not based on intentionality or social reality. His primary example is the mountain. OK, it seems plausible.

But what if the mountain turns out to be a valley in a larger entity that exists beyond of current consciousness. He said the significance of brute facts is that they are epistemlogically and ontologically obective. But about the world in a time of universal and unquestioned, unacknowledged, belief/knowledge of the existence of a god or gods? There are mountains and craters and deforestation and erosion that has undoubtedly altered the face of the earth over the past few millennia of human existence. Does that mean they were but are no longer brute facts? Does this just imply that nothing is permanent? At points in human history the existence of god(s) has been as seemingly permanent as the existence of the Amazon.

So even if, not convinced, you decide to accept my label of god as a brute fact at some earlier point in history, what does that imply for the contemporary period of disbelief, unbelief and apathetic atheism? Although millions if not billions of people continue to undoubtedly believe in god(s), there is a significant enough contingent of true atheists and unbelievers to have deconstructed a brute fact and turned it into a contested institutional fact. Is there any other such precedent? What would Searle say about this? If an institutional fact becomes an opinion, does that mean that god(s) is in fact dead since the brute fact no longer exists? Perhaps Zarathustra's mountain was no more real than the god that had died.

On the flip side...
If the existence of brute facts is independent of intersubjectivity or social institutions, such as langauge and symbolism, which allow thought, what happens if human were removed from the earth and just died all at once. Could those who believe in gad as a brute fact still prove god exists? Does god exist without institutional facts like language and by extension, thought?

Background--Searle building blocks

This construction of Searle's terms was helpful for me so I thought I'd share it.

Epistemic--expression of fact which is cognitive (individual perception) (8).
Objective-- observable, judgment is agreed upon by group (epistemically objective)
Ontogolical--involves judgment about objectively perceived things (8).
Subjectiveàobservable with features that mean something to the observers (10).
Intrinsic features--exist independent of user’s attitudes towards them (brute fact, objective, stone)
NonAgentive--naturally occurring function (heart pumping blood)
Observer-related featuresàexist with an “intentionality of agents (subjective because
object has a “relationship” with observer, paperweight).
Ontologically Subjective=Observer relative
Agentive--Observer relativeàintentionality to function (wood is chair), exist through collective intentionality (38)
Status Function--gained through agentive function
Collective Intentionality--"to engage in cooperative behavior” (23). Cannot be reduced.
‘I consciousness’ --derived from ‘we consciousness’
‘We consciousness’--exists internally (26)
Social fact--exists through collective intentionality
Regulative
Constitutive
Institutional facts--object’s agentive function is institutionally imposed.
Brute facts--“There are no institutional facts without brute facts” (58).
Ontologically subjective
Epistemically Objective (63).
Requires language (75).
Language dependent
Language independent--biological cognitions (62)

Musings on Searle

Bea and CCR debate aspects of Searle's The Construction of Social Reality

Collective intentionality:
Searle starts Chapter 1 by using the interaction between a waiter and himself at a French restaurant as an example of the "metaphysical burden" of the invisible ontology of social reality. He follows this example with the observation that the "complex structure of social reality is"weightless and invisible" (5).
It seems that Searle does not necessarily explore the plurality of social realities and the relativity of social facts but moves from the individual mind to the "group mind" (in his discussion of ontological and epistemic objectivity/subjectivity, observer-related phenomenon, and the assignment of agentive and non-agentive functions in Ch. 1 and collective intentionality and creation of institutional facts in Ch. 2).
He follows this example with the observation that the "complex structure of social reality is"weightless and invisible" (5). Is social reality really weightless as Searle purports?

Bea: It seems that Searle's reference point is socially relative. In some cultures, eating on the floor is customary. In others, eating raw fish from a street vendor is customary. In these instances, individuals who move from one social reality (in this case culture) to another feel the metaphysical burden of the socially-constructed ontology in which they operate. In this sense, does Searle meaning the there is an "overarching" social reality, a "majority" social reality (e.g., public nudity is for the most part frowned upon), or several plural social realities?

CCR: I don't necessarily think that Searle is addressing norms or culture when he talks about social reality. These seem to be matters of convention rather than fact (see p.28 for his distinction). Also, Searle talks about Background as a non-conscious premise that people create as they experience the world, and although the stranger in a foreign land may not have this initial Background from which to construct the social reality or social facts in particular social situations, the very fact that there are social facts, like eating on the ground for example, will be noted as a fact and incorporated by the stranger. And I'm sure if the stranger remains for long enough the initially foreign social facts will become parts of that individual's Background knowledge soon enough. My sense of his use of weightless was that these facts, unlike brute facts, are not composed of matter and thus have no physical weight.

Constitutive Facts:
CCR: Is god a constitutive fact of social reality? Does a god exist because its exists is an institutional and social fact for so many of the world's people? If reality is socially constructed based upon various types of facts, then is not its existence a fact?
For example, in Lebanon citizen's are required to have a religion, there is no such thing as an atheist, and from my experience there, such a statement about a belief in no god or higher power is not quite understood. Does this then mean that god is a fact? And if so, are all facts relative?

Relativity of social facts:
Bea: It seems that Searle's reference point is socially relative. In some cultures, eating on the floor is customary. In others, eating raw fish from a street vendor is customary. In these instances, individuals who move from one social reality (in this case culture) to another feel the metaphysical burden of the socially-constructed ontology in which they operate. In this sense, does Searle meaning the there is an "overarching" social reality, a "majority" social reality (e.g., public nudity is for the most part frowned upon), or several plural social realities?


CCR: Also, what happens when a social fact is contested? Do social facts degrade? For example, are social conservatives right when they saw that gay marriage will "destroy the institution of marriage"? If the "fact" of marriage is no longer a "we collective" agreement, and the constitutive rules are no longer uncontested, then does that mean marriage no longer exists as an institutional fact, but rather as a personal perception? If a gay married couple from, say, the Netherlands, where such a manifestation of the institution of marriage is recognized both legally and institutionally/socially, what are the facts of that marriage when they move to, say, Arkansas? If the "collective imposition of function" is contested, what happens to the fact? I would have like to see Searle address not only the creation of social reality, but also the contentious space created by attempts at constituting a contested reality.

Bea: It seems that Searle does not necessarily explore the plurality of social realities and the relativity of social facts but moves from the individual mind to the "group mind" (in his discussion of ontological and epistemic objectivity/subjectivity, observer-related phenomenon, and the assignment of agentive and non-agentive functions in Ch. 1 and collective intentionality and creation of institutional facts in Ch. 2).
- How might social reality be re-constructed when different groups interact? I would argue that Gramscian notion of hegemony would then apply at least in terms of culture which would extend obstensibly to language.
- Does group size matter? If social reality is rooted in the speech act and the speech act is what defines social reality, what implications does this have in a rapidly globalizing world? Is globalization bringing about a uniform social reality?


In chapter 2 Searle discusses the speech act... Is there a difference between a written speech act and a verbal speech act? Can you and should differentiate between the two? And is this relevant to his argument? Do social facts change if they're written versus spoken?

Does group size influence the ability to create institutional facts without writing? what about interconnectivity?

Bea: Searle argues the importance of language in constructing social reality (e.g., "Language is constitutive of institutional reality" p.60). When Searle discusses language, obstensibly he means both written and spoken language. I would argue that he does not sufficiently address the distinction between spoken language and written language. Spoken language assumes a real-time interactive audience and context that adds to the interpretation of the actual words. Written language is typically read singularly and consists of an independent assessment of the words. For example, if I say "I could die tonight", I as the speaker have more control over the meaning I wish to infuse into the statement. It could be joke or a threat depending on how I say it. If I write "I could die tonight" and someone reads it, the reader gains control over how this statement is interpreted. I did not find Searle to adequately address the difference between these two.

CCR: I don't believe the distinction between written and spoken language is relevant to the subject addressed in this book, the construction of social reality. Language itself is an institution, and writing is one aspect of this fact. In our debate yesterday Bea and I discussed whether, for example, a written contract creates a social fact that would not exist without it. Bea distinguished between the writing of a fact and the codification there in, while my perspective was that the concept of a written contract is an institution and only the institutional fact of my having written some marks on a piece of paper within the institution of the law and the regulatory rules that constitute it is relevant to Searle's point. As his example of the wall that although originally composed of rock ends up decaying so it is no longer visible, yet people continue to recognize an implicit border (see P. 39). It doesn't matter whether this border is recognized by the spoken or written word, since any attempt to conretize it only occurs within a system of other institutional facts, and the importance of the written versus the spoken is wrapped up in the social reality that has been constructed, not inherent in the written marks on a page.
Thesis of Book:

Bea: Searle sets forth that one of goals of his book is to prove that there is a reality that "is totally independent of us" (2). He does not actually prove that the real world exists. He concludes that "there is a real world but only that you are committed to its existence when you talk to me or to anyone else about it" (194). Given this conclusion, it seems that Searle uses language as the proof of reality. Therefore, it follows that language (spoken in this instance) is a relational tool requiring at least two people, who then both agree that what they are observing is what it is and, in doing so, create reality. If this is so, it seems to follow that Searle contradicts himself in that an independent reality exists when described through a socially constructed tool (language). So, does the tree that falls in the forest really fall if no one heard it?

CCR: And can you prove a fact through negation?

Hegemony and power
What role do the more powerful play in the construction of social reality? Searle never adequately addresses this point. It seems to me that a hegemon (relatively far more powerful), such as the United States or a feudal lord would have greater abilities to constitute new institutional facts since they can create regulatory rules and impose functionality that must be recognized by others. I'm thinking, for example, if the US says there is a war on terror, then there is because they can create and then interpret brute facts, which then become fodder for social facts like the WOT. If Burkina Faso did exactly the same thing I highly doubt the world would now be subject to a WOT.

If the more powerful indeed do have greater control and influence over the construction of social reality, what implications does this have for the have-nots? Does revolution depend on the deconstruction of social facts and constitutive rules?