Implications of Searle for Studying Norms--A Rebuttal to Prof. Jackson
[Disclaimer: For anyone out there on the Internet who is reading this blog, please understand that this blog is for the free exchange of and experimentation with ideas for educational purposes in a graduate course. I reserve the right to be persuaded by my peers, professors, or experiences to change my mind. --Suzanne Ghais]
1. My essential argument--in my own terminology first--is that norms are sufficiently separate from the observer that it is valid to make claims about norms, their diffusion or evolution or retrenchment, and their impacts on social and political behavior. It is also possible to evaluate such claims against the reality that is out there. Granted, once one has made the claim in writing or speaking that a norm exists, one has indeed participated in diffusing and buttressing that norm, in the same way that if a high schooler says to a new classmate, “You know, everyone smokes pot here,” he is spreading a norm that it is normal and acceptable to smoke pot in that community. However, this does not change the fact that the norm exists out there, independent of the observer, prior to the claim being made. The researcher can stand apart from the social phenomenon being researched, for a moment at least, and study it in all its observer-independent glory. As that researcher is reading articles, making notes, and drafting a paper or presentation, she is not changing anything out there (although she might if she does interviews, conducts site visits, or otherwise interacts with the subjects of study). Once that paper is read by anyone else or that presentation is heard by an audience, the wall of separation between researcher and subject crumbles. Prior to that, however, the “dualistic” relationship (using Prof. Jackson’s term from Syllabus, p. 2) of observer to observed holds true.
2. Prof. Jackson’s argument assumes, first, that Searle’s basic argument is correct. I am inclined to agree with this starting point. Searle's central argument is that even though there are phenomena out there that are independent of the observer, when it comes to social facts, and specifically the sub-class of these called institutional facts (such as money, marriage, or government), they exist only by virtue of collective agreement. This is a profound and, as Searle says, “terrifying” point (p. __--urghhh, can’t find the page number. Anyone?), though I also find it exciting. On the one hand (the terrifying side), if somehow a collective agreement emerges that U.S. paper money is worthless, or worse, that the phantom money in my bank account or IRA is worthless, then I’m poorer--maybe a lot poorer. On the other hand (the exciting side), Gandhi’s successful, nonviolent campaign to end British colonialism in India depended on his forging collective agreement among Indians that the British were simply not their rulers--the Indians did not need to comply with their laws or requirements. He used the ephemeral, consensus-dependent nature of institutional facts in order to attain independence for Indian people without violence (if this interests you please read Jonathan Schell’s The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People, 2004). Back to Searle, while I quibble with some finer points like the existence of collective intentionality (pp. 23-26), this nonetheless leaves his basic argument intact (we can substitute “broad agreement” or “consensus,” which is an aggregation of individual intentions and beliefs, without damage to his basic thesis). So, Prof. PTJ and I agree on the starting point.
3. My reading of Searle indicates he would agree with my argument about norms. He writes on the “Logical Priority of Brute Facts over Institutional Facts”: “there are no institutional facts without brute facts….Institutional facts exist, so to speak, on top of brute physical facts. Often the brute facts will not be manifested as physical objects but as sounds coming out of peoples’ mouths or as marks on paper--or even thoughts in their heads” (pp. 34-35, emphasis added). Similarly, in his discussion of epistemically and ontologically subjective and objective phenomena, he notes that “we can make epistemically objective statements about entities that are ontologically subjective. For example, … the statement ‘I now have a pain in my lower back’ reports an epistemically objective fact in the sense that it is made true by the existence of an actual fact that is not dependent on any stance, attitudes, or opinions of observers. However, the phenomenon itself, the actual pain, has a subjective mode of existence” (pp. 8-9). (Note that while I appreciate Prof. PTJ’s attempt to clarify these concepts, he confused me further… I went back to Searle and just focused on Searle’s definitions.) In other words, even if a phenomenon is ontologically subjective--like pain or norms--one can still make epistemically objective statements about them, meaning “the facts in the world that make them true or false are independent of anybody’s attitudes or feelings about them” (p. 8). Therefore, one can make epistemically objective statements about norms, the truth of which can be judged independent of the people making the judgements about the norms.
4. Here is specifically where I disagree with Prof. PTJ. He writes, in paragraph c: “But when we are talking about ontologically dependent objects and states of affairs -- interactive kinds [Searle’s “ontologically subjective” --SG]-- personal statements might still be opinions, but impersonal statements [Searle’s “epistemically objective” --SG] cannot be approximations to brute facts because there aren't any brute facts involved at the appropriate level of abstraction.” I am arguing that in fact there are brute facts involved, and I also argue that Searle would agree.
5. The brute facts of norms fall into three categories: (1) beliefs about what is right and wrong, acceptable and unacceptable; (2) behaviors that tend to comply with the norms--though there may be much non-complying behavior; and, perhaps most importantly, (3) reactions or self-explanations when norms have been violated. An example of this third category (drawn from Mark Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force,” International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 2 [Spring, 2001], pp. 215-250) is UN Resolution 242 declaring Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and other territory captured during the 1967 war illegitimate. In contrast, Israel’s earlier territorial acquisitions gained through its war of 1948--critically, before the norm of territorial integrity had made much headway--was never challenged by the international community. The point is that it is indeed possible to uncover the brute facts underlying norms through direct observation or by inference from direct observation. One can infer beliefs from what people post on signs during a street protest or what UN resolutions they support; one can directly observe whether behavior is norm-conforming, and one can directly observe the reactions to norm-violating behavior. All this can be done without shaping or constituting the norm in question.
6. I therefore disagree with Prof. PTJ’s conclusion that “claiming the existence of a norm is an observer-relative operation” or that “all we have is a collective intentionality in which we as social observers participate just as the other participants do.” (paragraph 2) or that “we cannot study norms the way that we might study ontologically independent, mind-independent features of the world. Instead, we necessarily participate in the process by which norms are formed and reformed even as we study those norms.” I conclude instead that norms are observer-independent and that we can study them the way we might study ontologically independent features of the world. While it is true that publishing or announcing one’s findings about norms contributes to shaping them, they nonetheless exist prior to their being studied, named, or described.
1. My essential argument--in my own terminology first--is that norms are sufficiently separate from the observer that it is valid to make claims about norms, their diffusion or evolution or retrenchment, and their impacts on social and political behavior. It is also possible to evaluate such claims against the reality that is out there. Granted, once one has made the claim in writing or speaking that a norm exists, one has indeed participated in diffusing and buttressing that norm, in the same way that if a high schooler says to a new classmate, “You know, everyone smokes pot here,” he is spreading a norm that it is normal and acceptable to smoke pot in that community. However, this does not change the fact that the norm exists out there, independent of the observer, prior to the claim being made. The researcher can stand apart from the social phenomenon being researched, for a moment at least, and study it in all its observer-independent glory. As that researcher is reading articles, making notes, and drafting a paper or presentation, she is not changing anything out there (although she might if she does interviews, conducts site visits, or otherwise interacts with the subjects of study). Once that paper is read by anyone else or that presentation is heard by an audience, the wall of separation between researcher and subject crumbles. Prior to that, however, the “dualistic” relationship (using Prof. Jackson’s term from Syllabus, p. 2) of observer to observed holds true.
2. Prof. Jackson’s argument assumes, first, that Searle’s basic argument is correct. I am inclined to agree with this starting point. Searle's central argument is that even though there are phenomena out there that are independent of the observer, when it comes to social facts, and specifically the sub-class of these called institutional facts (such as money, marriage, or government), they exist only by virtue of collective agreement. This is a profound and, as Searle says, “terrifying” point (p. __--urghhh, can’t find the page number. Anyone?), though I also find it exciting. On the one hand (the terrifying side), if somehow a collective agreement emerges that U.S. paper money is worthless, or worse, that the phantom money in my bank account or IRA is worthless, then I’m poorer--maybe a lot poorer. On the other hand (the exciting side), Gandhi’s successful, nonviolent campaign to end British colonialism in India depended on his forging collective agreement among Indians that the British were simply not their rulers--the Indians did not need to comply with their laws or requirements. He used the ephemeral, consensus-dependent nature of institutional facts in order to attain independence for Indian people without violence (if this interests you please read Jonathan Schell’s The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People, 2004). Back to Searle, while I quibble with some finer points like the existence of collective intentionality (pp. 23-26), this nonetheless leaves his basic argument intact (we can substitute “broad agreement” or “consensus,” which is an aggregation of individual intentions and beliefs, without damage to his basic thesis). So, Prof. PTJ and I agree on the starting point.
3. My reading of Searle indicates he would agree with my argument about norms. He writes on the “Logical Priority of Brute Facts over Institutional Facts”: “there are no institutional facts without brute facts….Institutional facts exist, so to speak, on top of brute physical facts. Often the brute facts will not be manifested as physical objects but as sounds coming out of peoples’ mouths or as marks on paper--or even thoughts in their heads” (pp. 34-35, emphasis added). Similarly, in his discussion of epistemically and ontologically subjective and objective phenomena, he notes that “we can make epistemically objective statements about entities that are ontologically subjective. For example, … the statement ‘I now have a pain in my lower back’ reports an epistemically objective fact in the sense that it is made true by the existence of an actual fact that is not dependent on any stance, attitudes, or opinions of observers. However, the phenomenon itself, the actual pain, has a subjective mode of existence” (pp. 8-9). (Note that while I appreciate Prof. PTJ’s attempt to clarify these concepts, he confused me further… I went back to Searle and just focused on Searle’s definitions.) In other words, even if a phenomenon is ontologically subjective--like pain or norms--one can still make epistemically objective statements about them, meaning “the facts in the world that make them true or false are independent of anybody’s attitudes or feelings about them” (p. 8). Therefore, one can make epistemically objective statements about norms, the truth of which can be judged independent of the people making the judgements about the norms.
4. Here is specifically where I disagree with Prof. PTJ. He writes, in paragraph c: “But when we are talking about ontologically dependent objects and states of affairs -- interactive kinds [Searle’s “ontologically subjective” --SG]-- personal statements might still be opinions, but impersonal statements [Searle’s “epistemically objective” --SG] cannot be approximations to brute facts because there aren't any brute facts involved at the appropriate level of abstraction.” I am arguing that in fact there are brute facts involved, and I also argue that Searle would agree.
5. The brute facts of norms fall into three categories: (1) beliefs about what is right and wrong, acceptable and unacceptable; (2) behaviors that tend to comply with the norms--though there may be much non-complying behavior; and, perhaps most importantly, (3) reactions or self-explanations when norms have been violated. An example of this third category (drawn from Mark Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force,” International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 2 [Spring, 2001], pp. 215-250) is UN Resolution 242 declaring Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and other territory captured during the 1967 war illegitimate. In contrast, Israel’s earlier territorial acquisitions gained through its war of 1948--critically, before the norm of territorial integrity had made much headway--was never challenged by the international community. The point is that it is indeed possible to uncover the brute facts underlying norms through direct observation or by inference from direct observation. One can infer beliefs from what people post on signs during a street protest or what UN resolutions they support; one can directly observe whether behavior is norm-conforming, and one can directly observe the reactions to norm-violating behavior. All this can be done without shaping or constituting the norm in question.
6. I therefore disagree with Prof. PTJ’s conclusion that “claiming the existence of a norm is an observer-relative operation” or that “all we have is a collective intentionality in which we as social observers participate just as the other participants do.” (paragraph 2) or that “we cannot study norms the way that we might study ontologically independent, mind-independent features of the world. Instead, we necessarily participate in the process by which norms are formed and reformed even as we study those norms.” I conclude instead that norms are observer-independent and that we can study them the way we might study ontologically independent features of the world. While it is true that publishing or announcing one’s findings about norms contributes to shaping them, they nonetheless exist prior to their being studied, named, or described.
Labels: objectivity, Searle, social phenomena, subjectivity
posted by Suzanne at 12:37 PM
3 Comments:
Suzanne, let me try to disagree with your points, mainly to the last two. But I'll try to write something about all your points (in order to better follow your reasoning and to have clearer discussion points).
Before I start, let me say that I do not agree with Searle in several points - mainly, his persistence in linking social facts to brute facts. I believe this link underestimates the flexibility of social facts/norms/ideas/concepts etc.
1) Norms are never independent from the observer. The mere existence of the norms is based on the constant negotiation of the meaning. Everyone smokes pot here is actually the result of the negotiation process which deemed -for instance- smoking pot to be cool within the context. The researcher can do an objective research as long as (i) she is not part of the community, (ii) she does not have stake in any part of the normative process (i.e. she is not a drug-dealer/concerned parent), and (iii) -as you said- she doesn't intervene. Though, that does not mean she is in the norm creation process or is immune from its impacts.
2-My problem with 'collective intentionality' is the ambiguity of the term. But anyhow, it still has explanatory power.
3- Now, this is one of the points I do not agree with Searle. Institutional facts exist - period. I would argue that the existence of our beautiful pain-scale can be used to disprove your claim about the epistemological objectiveness of the phrase.
4- Referring back to the first few phrases I wrote in the beginning, I would say there are no brute facts, no involvement of brute facts in any level in social reality. I mean, the function of the screwdriver has nothing to do with the shape of the tool. If we are to discuss its social implications - we don't even need to see it. (However, if we are to talk about the 'reality around the screwdriver', we need brute facts. In other words, if we are talking about state behavior, I can do it at an abstract level. But if we are to discuss the existence of a given state, I need more information about its borders, geography etc.)
5) I am not sure whether I understood what you are referring to when you say 'brute facts of norms' as all three points are socially constructed. Now, Resolution 242 does not declare the war illegitimate - it says that in order to fulfill UN charter requirements, Israel should withdraw its forces. Therefore, the judgment is not normative. It looks at the action and compares it to the writing. UNSC does not evaluate the Israeli actions with regard to territorial integrity norm, but to its charter. (By the way, I would also argue territorial integrity has been an important norm since 1648).
6- Norms are constructed by us. The words we use, the norms we choose to study, the assumptions we make etc. have an impact on the outcomes of our research. Even if you cannot see your direct involvement in the norm creation process, your motivation is impacted and impacts the norm.
I tried to write as short as possible, I hope my points were clear.
Let me know what you think!
Efe, I don't understand your point #3. Please clarify! Are you referring to the (completely arbitrary) 'pain scale' doctors use?
Yes, I'm referring to that scale. (Don't tell that it is completely arbitrary to Sarah!)
There is no pain-o-meter that measures your pain. That might be a 2 for you, 0 for me, and the doctor might think it is 10. Therefore, there is no epistemological objectivity in this sense. Your statement cannot be objectively tested.
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