[Disclaimer: For anyone out there on the Internet who is reading this blog, please understand that this blog is for the free exchange of and experimentation with ideas for educational purposes in a graduate course. I reserve the right to be persuaded by my peers, professors, or experiences to change my mind. --Suzanne Ghais]
1. My essential argument--in my own terminology first--is that norms are sufficiently separate from the observer that it is valid to make claims about norms, their diffusion or evolution or retrenchment, and their impacts on social and political behavior. It is also possible to evaluate such claims against the reality that is out there. Granted, once one has made the claim in writing or speaking that a norm exists, one has indeed participated in diffusing and buttressing that norm, in the same way that if a high schooler says to a new classmate, “You know, everyone smokes pot here,” he is spreading a norm that it is normal and acceptable to smoke pot in that community. However, this does not change the fact that the norm exists out there, independent of the observer, prior to the claim being made. The researcher can stand apart from the social phenomenon being researched, for a moment at least, and study it in all its observer-independent glory. As that researcher is reading articles, making notes, and drafting a paper or presentation, she is not changing anything out there (although she might if she does interviews, conducts site visits, or otherwise interacts with the subjects of study). Once that paper is read by anyone else or that presentation is heard by an audience, the wall of separation between researcher and subject crumbles. Prior to that, however, the “dualistic” relationship (using Prof. Jackson’s term from Syllabus, p. 2) of observer to observed holds true.
2. Prof. Jackson’s argument assumes, first, that Searle’s basic argument is correct. I am inclined to agree with this starting point. Searle's central argument is that even though there are phenomena out there that are independent of the observer, when it comes to social facts, and specifically the sub-class of these called institutional facts (such as money, marriage, or government), they exist only by virtue of collective agreement. This is a profound and, as Searle says, “terrifying” point (p. __--urghhh, can’t find the page number. Anyone?), though I also find it exciting. On the one hand (the terrifying side), if somehow a collective agreement emerges that U.S. paper money is worthless, or worse, that the phantom money in my bank account or IRA is worthless, then I’m poorer--maybe a lot poorer. On the other hand (the exciting side), Gandhi’s successful, nonviolent campaign to end British colonialism in India depended on his forging collective agreement among Indians that the British were simply not their rulers--the Indians did not need to comply with their laws or requirements. He used the ephemeral, consensus-dependent nature of institutional facts in order to attain independence for Indian people without violence (if this interests you please read Jonathan Schell’s The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People, 2004). Back to Searle, while I quibble with some finer points like the existence of collective intentionality (pp. 23-26), this nonetheless leaves his basic argument intact (we can substitute “broad agreement” or “consensus,” which is an aggregation of individual intentions and beliefs, without damage to his basic thesis). So, Prof. PTJ and I agree on the starting point.
3. My reading of Searle indicates he would agree with my argument about norms. He writes on the “Logical Priority of Brute Facts over Institutional Facts”: “there are no institutional facts without brute facts….Institutional facts exist, so to speak, on top of brute physical facts. Often the brute facts will not be manifested as physical objects but as sounds coming out of peoples’ mouths or as marks on paper--or even thoughts in their heads” (pp. 34-35, emphasis added). Similarly, in his discussion of epistemically and ontologically subjective and objective phenomena, he notes that “we can make epistemically objective statements about entities that are ontologically subjective. For example, … the statement ‘I now have a pain in my lower back’ reports an epistemically objective fact in the sense that it is made true by the existence of an actual fact that is not dependent on any stance, attitudes, or opinions of observers. However, the phenomenon itself, the actual pain, has a subjective mode of existence” (pp. 8-9). (Note that while I appreciate Prof. PTJ’s attempt to clarify these concepts, he confused me further… I went back to Searle and just focused on Searle’s definitions.) In other words, even if a phenomenon is ontologically subjective--like pain or norms--one can still make epistemically objective statements about them, meaning “the facts in the world that make them true or false are independent of anybody’s attitudes or feelings about them” (p. 8). Therefore, one can make epistemically objective statements about norms, the truth of which can be judged independent of the people making the judgements about the norms.
4. Here is specifically where I disagree with Prof. PTJ. He writes, in paragraph c: “But when we are talking about ontologically dependent objects and states of affairs -- interactive kinds [Searle’s “ontologically subjective” --SG]-- personal statements might still be opinions, but impersonal statements [Searle’s “epistemically objective” --SG] cannot be approximations to brute facts because there aren't any brute facts involved at the appropriate level of abstraction.” I am arguing that in fact there are brute facts involved, and I also argue that Searle would agree.
5. The brute facts of norms fall into three categories: (1) beliefs about what is right and wrong, acceptable and unacceptable; (2) behaviors that tend to comply with the norms--though there may be much non-complying behavior; and, perhaps most importantly, (3) reactions or self-explanations when norms have been violated. An example of this third category (drawn from Mark Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force,” International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 2 [Spring, 2001], pp. 215-250) is UN Resolution 242 declaring Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and other territory captured during the 1967 war illegitimate. In contrast, Israel’s earlier territorial acquisitions gained through its war of 1948--critically, before the norm of territorial integrity had made much headway--was never challenged by the international community. The point is that it is indeed possible to uncover the brute facts underlying norms through direct observation or by inference from direct observation. One can infer beliefs from what people post on signs during a street protest or what UN resolutions they support; one can directly observe whether behavior is norm-conforming, and one can directly observe the reactions to norm-violating behavior. All this can be done without shaping or constituting the norm in question.
6. I therefore disagree with Prof. PTJ’s conclusion that “claiming the existence of a norm is an observer-relative operation” or that “all we have is a collective intentionality in which we as social observers participate just as the other participants do.” (paragraph 2) or that “we cannot study norms the way that we might study ontologically independent, mind-independent features of the world. Instead, we necessarily participate in the process by which norms are formed and reformed even as we study those norms.” I conclude instead that norms are observer-independent and that we can study them the way we might study ontologically independent features of the world. While it is true that publishing or announcing one’s findings about norms contributes to shaping them, they nonetheless exist prior to their being studied, named, or described.
Labels: objectivity, Searle, social phenomena, subjectivity
