Leaving Social Science to Social Scientists

(Well, I tried to post this as a comment, but apparently it was too long, so here we go - this is my comment to Namalie's post)

Are we doing that 'well it is the end of the semester, so I don't need to be politically correct' blog posts now? Please say yes, because that's what I have in mind right now!

I have a 'mild' position when it comes to answering questions such as what is social science, what is reality, and how can a research claim 'truth' (or make truth claims)? It is probably because I spent a couple of years at a sociology department at a 'technical' university (yes, I have a bachelor of science). The department was working day and night to differentiate itself from 'humanities' and to prove that sociology is a science.

Anyhow, I consider myself to be (or aspiring to be) a social scientist. And I was highly offended by Flyvbjerg (F9) book. I also find it difficult to call F9 a social scientist, not because of his ideas but because of his field of study. At the end of the day, this book sounds like the ideas of a non-social scientists about what he believes to be social science research. I have three main reasons for that: (i) his inconsistency in explaining the debates about social sciences, (ii) his interesting incorporation of Dreyfus&Dreyfus's learning styles into the debate, and (iii) his 'last' recommendation about activism.

Before the discussion in class, I had no idea what F9's main argument was. He starts with a discussion of contextual vs. context-independent information, then moves to a qualitative vs quantitative debate, and ends up with activism vs. pure research (?) debate. Firstly, these debates are not related with each other at all. Looking for context-independent knowledge does not necessarily require the use of quantitative data or to ignore activism. Besides, his understanding of context-independent was 'underdeveloped'. Context-independent does not necessarily mean ignoring human interactions, traditions etc. (see p.38-9).

Expert level in research... I don't know where to start. F9 gives the example of pilots: Novice pilots "fly their planes," while..experienced pilots "they fly" (p.19). Yes, when you gain competency in a skill, the way you do things change. The step-by-step thinking is no longer taking place conciously. If you guys were ever in a position to talk about your own research, you must have realized how difficult it is to explain it - but that does not mean there is a system that we are following! When I face a new case, I don't go in and look around randomly (I am sorry, the correct word is -I believe- intuitively, not randomly). I have methodological assumptions, analytical tools, methods to guide me. When I want to write a paper, I have an idea about how it should be structured. Maybe I don't follow strict guidelines to see what I should include in each part (abstract, introduction, etc) but that doesn't mean it is all intuition. Long story short, social scientists follow rules and procedures in reading, writing, teaching. When these rules and procedures are retracted to the background, that does not necessarily mean we try to comprehend everything as a whole (like the soccer player who score with a never-practiced play before), we know where to look because of our training.

Activism... is good (by the way, I am going to overlook consultancy here. Let's assume you are a sole activist). It is nice - sometimes it helps us change things. There we have another inconsistency - as Namalie quoted "we cannot find ultimate answers to these questions or even a single version of what the questions are". If you get this quote and put it on top of activism, what will keep any """researcher""" (I had to use triple sarcastic quotation marks to make my point) from manipulating data or results? Especially given the fact that there is no structure for these processes.

Long story short, some of you might know my dislike towards KKV. [And my dislike is mostly based on the fact that they boil down the methodological debate to quantitative/qualitative(actually to case studies/case analysis) and upgrade the latter with former so that we can use cases to create hypotheses.] But if I were in a two-party system with KKV and F9, I would definitely vote for KKV. As social scientists, we should look for generalizable (either across cases or across time) knowledge. We should be able to make validity claims (assuming that we except external social reality). A strong relativist approach (surrounded by I am not a relativist claims) is not the way to make social science matters. Robust research designs, sophisticated techniques, and actually easy-to-understand visual representation of data, in my humble opinion, are the ways to make sure social science matters again.


PS: Just for fun, this is the federal definition for 'research' (coming from IRB definition for human subject research):Research is a systematic investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.

"The Image of Japan in the International Community"

As a (slightly delayed) follow up to our discussion on Epstein, you might be interested to know that Japan has decided to end whaling (wow, that was fast). Check out this bit from a Japanese official, which you can see here:

Asked about the motivation behind the sudden announcement, Inoue said, "It cannot be denied that that whaling severely and unnecessarily damages the image of Japan in the international community, due to the strong sentiment against whaling in many countries," speaking through an interpreter. "There is no longer any economic need for Japan to obtain protein from the whales, so it would be irrational and pointless to continue catching whales."

Interesting how Japan can just jump into a different position in the discourse (and with minimal fanfare as well). Interesting also the timing of the announcement--just over a month after the earthquakes.

One thing that we never had the opportunity to discuss is Epstein's use of the concept of "subject positions." Prof PTJ mentioned that he did not find them useful, but I still do not understand why. To me, this example of Japan is the perfect demonstration of the necessity of a "subject position." How else would we be able to explain Japan's rapid shift, and the probable acceptance of it except to say that Japan has put itself into a new subject position? This subject position has a history, a context, and even a language which Japan can now invoke.

What do you think?

(And in full disclosure, for me, writing this post is slightly selfish--I want to understand this before I start babbling about subject positions in my research proposal).

Scholarship and (not “versus”) Activism

Flyvbjerg’s case for phronetic research—one explicitly driven by values and engaged with the world outside academia—is compelling. He summarizes the core of this approach in “the following three value-rational questions: (1) Where are we going? (2) Is this desirable? (3) What should be done?” He adds, “Phronetic researchers can see no neutral ground, no ‘view from nowhere,’ for their work” (61). The scholar, in other words, need not apologize for having a stance. Though this approach is refreshing, it leaves me confused about where the distinction lies between scholarship and activism.

Flyvbjerg’s account of his involvement in the Aalborg development debate is instructive. He finds, like so many city planners do, that the Chamber of Commerce wields disproportionate power over the elected and duly appointed officials overseeing land-use planning. (I know planners in the Denver metropolitan area who have had the exact same complaint.) He laments that the Chamber pushes hard for catering to, and thus encouraging the growth of, automobile traffic.

Clearly, Flyvbjerg has a stance himself on the issues being debated in Aalborg:

With a roughly 50 percent increase in bicycle and public transportation in downtown Aalborg during the first decade of the Aalborg Project, and without the projected 35 percent decline in automobile traffic, but an increase instead, … the pressure on downtown road space has produced harmful effects on environment, traffic safety, and traffic flow…. Thus the losers in the struggle over the Aalborg Project were… virtually all of the city’s and the region’s half-million inhabitants plus many visitors (153).

From my experience working on transportation issues, I can attest that many people would not see increased car traffic in downtown Aalborg as a bad thing. Some would prefer this scenario over seeing all of those cars go to shopping malls in the distant suburbs; others would point to the reality that with so many people driving cars, planners must do what is possible to accommodate them and keep the motor-vehicle traffic flowing smoothly.

Flyvbjerg’s partisan stance caused me to wonder how different Flyvbjerg’s writing and scholarship would be if he were hired by the Danish Cyclists’s Federation (mentioned on 157) or an environmental NGO to write public relations material for them. Flyvbjerg would probably readily accept that he has a stance, since to the phronetic researcher there is “no neutral ground” (61). Still, he does seem to be making some claim to having a view of the situation that is closer to the truth than the view of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce: to him, the headline “Aalborg’s Best Customers Come Driving in Cars” is “misleading” (150).

Flyvbjerg does attempt to discuss what makes a scholar’s stance or interpretation more valid. He argues that a focus on values does not mean an anything-goes relativism—“one interpretation is not just as good as another” (130); yet the main criterion seems to be whether “a better interpretation demonstrates the previous interpretation to be ‘merely‘ interpretation.” He concedes that “social science and philosophy have not yet identified criteria by which an ultimate interpretation and a final grounding of values and facts can be made” (131). Some phronetic scholarship is better than others, then, but what makes it so is, apparently, difficult to make explicit.

In helping the reader better understand phronetic social science, Flyvbjerg provides other examples (162-65), including the book Promiscuities: A Secret History of Female Desire by Naomi Wolf. In describing this book, Flyvbjerg calls it “less academic, though still scholarly informed”—so he is making a distinction between academic and non-academic writing, though the word “less” implies that it is a continuum, not a bright line. I happen to be a big fan of Wolf because of an earlier work of hers, The Beauty Myth. This latter book is extremely thoroughly researched, yet I would probably put it in the category of popular nonfiction rather than scholarship (similar to his assessment of Promiscuities), though I have a hard time pinpointing why. Perhaps it is because the book is intended for a general audience, not an academic one. Yet Flyvbjerg argues strenuously for engaging with the real world, not staying cloistered in the academic domain: “dialogue with groups outside of academia… is at the heart of phronetic social science” (157-58). The audience, then, is apparently not the decisive factor in determining what makes scholarship. Promiscuities is now on my summer reading list, and a quick look at the few pages available online reveals that a portion of it is devoted to autobiographical material related to Wolf’s own adolescence. Is this what makes it less academic and more pop? Not to Flyvbjerg—to him, “Doing narrative” (136) is among his methodological guidelines (chapter 9). If Wolf’s writing is not scholarship to Flyvbjerg, then, it is neither because of the audience nor because of personal narrative.

My questions about phronetic social science, then, remain unanswered. If scholarship is driven by values (see, e.g., 130), what makes it scholarship rather than advocacy? What is the difference between scholarship and non-scholarly nonfiction? If social scientists are not only free to take a stance but perhaps even obligated to do so, what distinguishes the validity of their interpretation from the validity of any partisan on an issue?As Namalie suggests, maybe we all need to learn to be more comfortable with such ambiguity.

Small Questions and Big Answers

Bent Flyvbjerg joins the melee of the science wars and states that he knows how to make social science matter again. Suffering from physics envy, the social sciences have attempted to adopt natural science methods, believing that analytic rationality is the best way to understand the world around us. According to Flyvbjerg, such an attempt is a mistake as since the social sciences seek to explain human phenomena, and therefore requires a more reflexive, context-dependent analysis, natural science methods cannot work. Instead, we should focus on adopting a phronetic approach, “by anchoring [our] research in the context studied and thereby ensuring a hermeneutic ‘fusion of horizons’”(132).

I was struck by this particular quote:

The task of phronetic social science is to clarify and deliberate about the problems and risks we face and to outline how things may be done differently, in full knowledge that we cannot find ultimate answers to these questions or even a single version of what the questions are (140).

I can see that there is something unsatisfying about the end result of phronetic social science. We can come up with some ideas about a problem, but as for the quest for the holy grail of the universal answer, Flyvbjerg seems to state that it is not going to happen. Is it true that there are no true answers? It is important to emphasize that Flyvbjerg believes that no one studying the social sciences can find the universal truth, as “predictive theories and universals cannot be found in the study of human affairs” (73). Additionally, with the above quote, is Flyvbjerg going into normative territory? While Flyvbjerg does not go so far as to state here that social scientists should outline how things should be, he later then states that the goal of phronetic research is “to produce input for ongoing social dialogue and social praxis rather than definitive, empirically verifiable knowledge,” which appears to have more of a normative focus (115). Kate’s post does an excellent job of pointing out that there are pros and cons to this approach.

What are the boundaries of phronetic research? What we should do, according to Flyvbjerg, is to study “both the small, local context, which gives phenomena their immediate meaning, and the larger, international and global context in which phenomena can be appreciated for their general and conceptual significance” (136). The links between phronetic research and ethnography seem to be evident to me with this statement, but I agree with Kate that Flyvbjerg seems to be a little condescending towards ethnography with the later quote: “the phronetic researcher becomes a part of the phenomenon studied, without necessarily ‘going native’ or the project becoming simple action research” (132). Keeping yourself from getting to embedded in your research but at the same being invested enough to gain valuable insights seems to be a delicate and difficult act to manage. Additionally, what is the issue with action research when phronetic scholars wish to answer the “so what” question and have a practical grounding to their work?

I was confused by Flyvbjerg’s claim that it is unproductive to pit knowledge of the particular against the knowledge of the general (scientific), as it seemed to be a weak attempt to mend fences. Flyvjberg states that instead we should think about these two ways in conjunction and that “we should only criticize the dominance of these phenomena to the exclusion of others in modern society and in social science” (49). So does this mean that there is actually a place for nomothetic, quantitative research in the social sciences? According to Flyvbjerg, he does seem to think so, but that this “practical social-science activity does not require advanced graduate and post-graduate specialized institutions of higher learning,” which seems to me like a form of academic smack talk and to be of the same unproductive nature he warned us against before (166-7).

Appreciating ambiguity, instead of looking for the how-to guide to social phenomena, is what should be the goal of social scientists according to Flyvbjerg. Part of our struggle this semester has been the discovery that we have not been able to come up with answers to our questions. Perhaps being comfortable with such ambiguity can change us, according to Flyvbjerg, from (KKV?) manual-clutching novices to experts.

*My page numbers may be a little off, as I was reading from the the Kindle version of this book

Coming Full Circle Back to Weber

I couldn’t help but thinking back to Weber’s Vocational Lectures while reading Flyvbjerg, as I felt that a research practice that rigorously followed his guidelines would lead to a blurring of the boundaries between Weberian ideal-types of political and scientific vocations. I am not prepared to take a normative stance on whether this is “good” or “bad,” but think that it might be interesting to examine the contexts in which this might occur, and the power implications it might have.

The distinction between science and politics vocations began to blur for me once he started talking about phronetic research seeking to be dialogical “in the sense that it includes, and, if successful, is itself included in, a polyphony of voices, with no one voice, including that of the researcher, claiming final authority” (139). He urges researchers to “consciously expose themselves to reactions from their surroundings – both positive and negative” thus allowing them to “[become] a part of the phenomenon studied, without necessarily ‘going native’ or the project becoming simple action research” (132). (Side note: why the condescending tone towards ethnography or "simple" action research?)

Here’s what appeals to me about his phronetic and dialogical approach:

1. The idea that engaging with the phenomenon under study will avoid “so what” results that gather dust is obviously very appealing.

2. And I strongly agree that when we feel our work matters or will be read, “[our] senses are … sharpened” and our work becomes of higher quality and more experientially interesting (p.158-9).

3. His emphasis on choosing small questions (133) and focusing on deeds over discourse (134) seems critical to revitalizing social science and our understanding of the world. “A discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is a discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and … a discipline without exemplars is an ineffective one” (87). (Even though I see a greater possibility for this feeding back into “theory” more broadly defined).

But under what contexts is engaging politically potentially beneficial, and when should it be questioned according to Foucault’s own maxim that “ ‘the political task’ is ‘to criticize the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent’” (as quoted by Flyvbjerg, 102). Assuming Machiavellian worst-case scenario thinking, and recognizing that scholars are only as moral as the next political actor, what checks and balances can be established to avoid abuses of academic power (see Flyvbjerg’s discussion, bottom of p.95)?

As a discussion piece, I would propose seeking to answer this puzzle through his own research agenda:

1. Where are we going with a dialogical scholarly practice?

a. What is the perceived purpose of this engagement?

b. What is the future role of traditional “ivory-tower” domains like universities, or peer-review journals versus more “popular” venues of teaching, writing, and discussion?

2. Who gains and who loses, and by what mechanisms of power when scholars engage in dialogical scholarly practice?

a. In what ways could this be seen as asserting a privileged position in political discourse?

b. For example, scholars may have a more powerful voice in a political conversation than many more heavily-implicated but less-educated stakeholders.

3. Is it desirable?

a. (I think this question speaks for itself)

4. What should be done?

a. Under what contexts might this more active form of research be more or less justified?

I would like to reiterate that I don’t see his dialogical phronetic approach as a bad thing, and in fact I find it extremely exciting to potentially be more actively engaged with the issues that I study. I just think that it is important to hash out the implications.

What is the difference between discourse analysis and ethnography?

The conversations both in class and on the blog have made me realize that I'm not quite clear about the distinction between discourse analysis and ethnography. I feel I could identify each by example--Epstein's book is discourse analysis, while Orr's book is an ethnography--but it's not exactly clear to me which makes which which. (Two asides: Firstly, I think Wittgenstein's response to my observation here would be, "Duh." Secondly, to jump ahead a bit, this problem of example versus universal defining feature is discussed in an interesting way in pp 67-69 of the Flyvbjerg book. I'm Plato in that example, and that's not a good thing according to Flyvbjerg. But anyway, leaving aside the question of whether I'm asking the right question here....)

On the topic of the boundaries of discourse that Caroline raised and that we discussed briefly in class, I find myself wondering not only where a given discourse (for example, discourse about whaling) begins and ends, but rather how the parameters of what constitutes discourse are established. For example, Epstein describes discourse analysis as a focus "not primarily on words as such but rather on the production of meaning. Thus , it is concerned with any type of signifying practice, that is, any practice that functions as a site for the production of meaning" (186). So we include not only talk, but consumption habits, etc. She goes on to note that this meaning emerges "in the exchange between social actors" and thus the context for such an exchange must be taken into consideration.

But wasn't this what we were doing in ethnography? Trying to observe, understand, and analyze practices that function as sites for the production of meaning? Weren't we documenting exchanges between social actors in distinct contexts to try to grasp at local meanings? Is the difference in discourse analysis that these meanings are broader reaching? That they are public? Is this what distinguishes Orr's analysis of dialogue between technicians from Eptein's analysis of rhetoric among anti-whaling activists? Is it the historical dimension of discourse analysis that makes it distinct? That we can trace the evolution of a discourse over time, whereas an ethnography captures something that is happening in the moment? But then, in our ethnography, would it not be appropriate to include analysis of historical documents? For example, Orr looks at the way that the technician's manual has evolved over time and reads from that a larger story about the systematization or institutionalization of work.

Perhaps this will become clearer as we undertake our own discourse analysis in the in-class workshop. But if anyone has any thoughts on this, I'd love some help in trying to understand!

The danger of a single story or discourse

First of all I LOVE TED talks but this one in particular by Chimamanda Adichie, had me thinking about discourse and the how the "stories" we are told inform how we look at the world and even the kinds of questions we ask and the basic assumptions we employ.

Of course, this isn't exactly about IR, but it still resonated with me. I thought I'd share.

If as the speaker says "a single story robs people of dignity" how can discourse analysis help us tell other parts of the "story"?

It Doesn't Matter What You Say But Where You Say It

If I were to undertake a discourse analysis what would be the major methodological critiques? Here I am concerned with both scoping discourses during analysis and evaluating final analyses.

On the issue of scoping, are all discourses as clearly delimited as the whaling discourse that Charlotte Epstein defines in The Power of Words in International Relations (2008)? Is the whaling discourse as clearly definable as Epstein presents it?

Defining the boundaries of a discourse and assessing the power of one discourse over other discourses may be easier in certain cases. How did Epstein judge that the cold war democratization and environmentalism discourses/meta-narratives are the most important ones for backgrounding the whaling discourse? I am not arguing that they are not important. I simply aim to point out the role of the researcher in steering the analysis. What about the civil rights movement (alluded to but not expressed, p.100) that unlocked citizen agency, and the discourses around pop culture that arose with the “televisual” revolution (p.100 and 143)? What criteria did Epstein use in deciding (or not) to limit their analysis?

It seems as though the definition of a discourse’s boundaries is important for two methodological implications. The first is that since discourses prescribe “subject-positions” and their related “articulations” and “interpellations”, the researcher’s choice to foreground certain discourses or to interpret the displacement of one discourse by another will determine the possible subject-positions under analysis. These subject-positions (and subjectivities) create the context for possible paths within a discourse, as it is the actor choices and power relations with other actors that then reproduce or alter/substitute the discourse.

For example, the anti-whaling discourse was powerful because it created categories of engagement that shaped actor identities. Within an identity, such as anti-whaler, the actor has certain choices, such as the choice to not consume whale meat. Thus the researcher’s choice of discourse boundaries will influence how she/he interprets actor moves.

The second implication of a discourse’s boundaries and perceived power over other discourses corresponds to my initial concern with evaluating a discourse analysis. For a new researcher choosing a dissertation topic, Epstein’s endorsement of the “test of time” (p.173) to evaluate the validity of a discourse analysis provides little consolation.

My guess is that unlike essentialist, positive truth claims which are based on hypotheses using quantitative bodies of evidence, discourse analyzers must constantly check the consistency of their truth claims, as the constitutive pieces of the discourse (e.g. “words, actions, music, and centrally on the case of whales, images,” p. 5) build on each other, or unfold in the researcher’s narrative.

When judging the final product, the validity and value of the analysis will depend of course on the accuracy of the information constituting the discourse. But also, a discourse analysis must be judged within the context it is set, substantively, academically and culturally. It matters less which story the research chooses to tell than how (and where) she/he chooses to tell it.

Remember: "You are who you say you are, or rather you are who you speak as" (p. 169). The old axiom, "it doesn't matter what you say but how you say it" is relevant here as well. The "how" in the context of discourse analysis translates to the "where." The analysis locates speaking-actors in terms of their discourses and subject-positions. Well, maybe it matters what you say as well, but the point of discourse analysis is to highlight the importance of context.

My favorite anti-whaling discourse!!!!

The use of the subject-position in the [anti-]whaling discourse

The Power of Words in International Relations: Birth of an Anti-Whaling Discourse offers an examination of the anti-whaling discourse (in all of its slogan-wielding, science-leveraging, and morality-defining)* and its past and present opponent (in all of its nationalism-defining, commodity-trading, and identity-holding)*. Epstein presents the discourse as having "subject-positions," which can be distinguished from subjectivities and likewise from the actors themselves. This technique allows her to "draw the distinction between 'subject-positions' and 'subjectivity,' which . . . offers a way of analyzing state identities unencumbered by a host of issues unavoidably bundled with the concept of subjectivity" (Epstein 253). The use of subject-positions also allows a compelling third option to the structure-agency debate insofar as agent enters into and takes on a subject-position, but can change the course of the subject-position. We can see this interplay in the strengthening of the anti-whaling subject position when different agents with disparate interests begin to work together for a common purpose (or, rather, a common anti-purpose).

The use of subject positions is a compelling method for discourse analysis. It allows Epstein to fluidly travel from an interstate to state to intrastate to group to individual level of analysis, while still talking about the same thing. In each level of analysis, an actor has the potential to go through the distinctive motion of "stepping into" (14) a particular subject-position. The actor, therefore, takes on the identity of the subject-position, along with the I/we of the subject-position.

Subject-positions, in Epstein's reconstruction, are opposed to an "other." The anti-whaling discourse defines itself in relation to the pro-whaling discourse, and the anti-anti-whaling discourse defines itself in relation to the anti-whaling discourse. Epstein picks up on this idea of the construction of identities in relation to the "other," allowing an alliance to emerge between material and ideational co-constitution. She also uses this identity formation in her own construction of the book. She compares and contrasts the two subject-positions in order to highlight parallels and differences between them, allowing one to act as a foil for the other, and the discourse to act as a foil for the present and perhaps future direction of the discourse.

Three questions emerge from a reading of the book and an examination of the use of subject-positions. The first question concerns the research method: when is an actor's discourse (either through word or deed) considered a manifestation of the imbibing of the subject-position in question, and when is it considered outside of the scope of the subject-position? For example, in Epstein's discussion of science, she holds that while science becomes more marginalized within the discourse, it continues to hold a privileged subject-position because of the nature of its academic authority. When is science, however, a part of the science subject-position, when is it a part of the pro-whaling subject-position, and when is it a part of the anti-whaling subject position. Obviously, a statement on the endangerment of whales is a part of both the scientific and the anti-whaling subject-position. But what about a statement that doesn't necessarily fit into the pro- or anti-whaling discourse? Alternatively, how is the researcher able to determine whether a statement or action is a manifestation of the subject-position versus whether it is not initially, but is subsumed into the subject-position?

The second question concerns the opposition of the subject-position as the "other." There are two layers to this question: examining the self-identification of the subject-position as opposed to the "other," and examining the subject-position in relation to its "other" (the first concerning the subject-position's own identity, and the second concerning the researcher's performance in reporting their findings). Is this use of using an external reference to define a subject-position useful, and, more importantly, is it necessary? Is referential examination of subject-positions within a discourse a necessary part of discourse analysis? Put differently, is the examination of contestation (in meaning, in norms, in cooperation, in material things, in ideas) a necessity to discourse analysis?

Third, is the examination of discourse, and the use of the subject-position, able to indeed strike a compromise between the material and the ideational and between structure and agency? Epstein certainly indicates that the use of discourse analysis, examining the subject-positions within the discourse, renders these debates defenseless. Is it convincing?

*This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of Epstein's careful characterization of the whaling, anti-whaling, and anti-anti-whaling subject-positions.

Image by Roberto Mangosi, who can be found here.

Of Identities and National Interests

I like Charlotte Epstein's book first because she forces us to confront what – at least most of – probably consider to be common sense: that hunting whales is wrong! While her book has not made me a supporter of the whale hunt, it has made me realise that many of our “rational” reasons for disagreeing with the hunt are not quite as well founded as we might have believed. It also make us (re)confront the idea that norms are indeed socially constructed.

Whaling aside, Epstein presents an excellent example of how identity (both of individuals and states) has influence in international relations. Realist conceptions of IR speak almost entirely in terms of “state interests.” If it is in a state's interest to do something then it will do it. If a state views it to be in its interest to hunt whales then it would do so. Conversely, if it were in its national interests to become an anti-whaling state, then it would do so also. Epstein clearly demonstrates that national identity often plays a significant role is determining exactly what constitutes a state's “interests.”

An example related to Epstein's work is that of the Canadian seal hunt. The revenue generated by the infamous harp seal hunt in eastern Canada is small in comparison to the problems it creates with regards to trade embargos in Europe and elsewhere. In a realist view, Ottawa should end the seal hunt immediately. Instead the Canadian government recently began serving seal meat in the parliamentary restaurant. Why? Because the seal hunt is viewed as part of the identity of Atlantic Canada (particularly Newfoundland). Even though this is only a small part of the country overall, in this case, regional identity has trumped broader national economic considerations.

That is all well and good for whales and seals, but what about more (in a realist view) important things, like national security? An IR constructivist could point to the 1997 land-mine ban treaty. Despite being very militarily effective weapons, following a worldwide campaign, 133 countries signed a treaty banning the construction and use of land mines. The signatory states decided that their identities as countries that did not use these terrible maiming weapons trumped any national security interests.

Of course a realist retort might be that twelve years after it came into effect, only 40 of the 133 countries that signed the Landmine Ban Treaty have actually ratified it. Furthermore, the countries that have not signed the treaty are the ones that make and/or use most of the world's landmines: namely the US, China, Russia, India, North and South Korea, and Israel.

What about weapons of far more significance than landmines -- nuclear weapons. At around the same time that the anti-whaling movement was gaining support, another movement, this one about the morality of possessing nuclear weapons, was also becoming prominent. Despite an anti-nuclear campaign that was far louder than the anti-whaling one, there was (and still is) almost no chance that the nuclear-armed states will decide to the relinquish their destructive capabilities (with the unique exception of South Africa).

While identities can and do shape national interests, this is only in cases where more fundamental interests, such as state security, are not gravely threatened.

Finally, Epstein's discussion of how the Maori people carve up beached whales appears to be a far better idea than what they tried to do with a whale carcass in Oregon:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZFwxH3PPWiU